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I. INTRODUCTION
The Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) assertion of a
constitutionally inappropriate—and as this article will argue,
unlawful—role in the affairs of state has severely compromised
Russia’s secular constitutional framework. This gradual but steady
erosion of the barrier between church and state in Russia is
evidenced by a series of contemporary developments that are
inexorably linked to the Church’s vision of its traditional place in
Russian history. Taken together, these developments demonstrate a
consistent and expanding effort on the part of the ROC to insinuate
its views and beliefs into official Russian government policy.
Disturbingly, each successive post-communist regime has further
enabled this behavior, and there is no indication that the political
transition from President Vladimir Putin to his hand-picked
successor, Dmitry Medvedev, will change anything. The pattern that
emerges from this collusion presents a serious challenge to Russia’s
constitutional order and to the country’s regional and international
human rights commitments—chief among these being the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.
Principally, this Article examines the chain of events that has left
the ROC poised to continue to expand its influence over
government policy under the Putin-orchestrated administration of
President Medvedev. It also adds to the growing body of evidence
illustrating the deterioration of the rule of law in Russia—particularly
the government’s cavalier disregard of the 1993 Constitution and its
international commitments. For background purposes, Part II of this
article will set out the constitutional and political treatment of
church-state relations and freedom of conscience under Soviet rule.
This discussion will also briefly cover the Church’s historical role in
708

BLITT. FIN

707]

9/2/2008 7:10 PM

How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia

Russian history and help identify patterns in the church-state
relationship that remain relevant today.
Part III examines the period of post-Communist tumult wherein
both the ROC and the government struggled to redefine
relationships with each other and with the Russian people after
seventy years of totalitarianism. This section covers the turbulent
years of 1990–1997 and considers, inter alia, the Church’s
cementing positions concerning fundamental rights in Russia, its
vision of the Church in Russian society, and the significance of
Russia’s constitutional order. Part IV addresses developments in
Russia up until the present day and highlights key behavioral patterns
between the ROC and the State, which illustrate both parties’ utter
lack of regard for the country’s constitutional order or its
international commitments. This section also reasons that the debate
over whether the ROC is or is not a “state church” misses the real
issue. Both sides actually benefit by not committing to an “official”
state church: the government benefits from the unflagging political
support of the ROC’s hierarchy and adherents; and the Church
retains its institutional autonomy while securing its preferential status
above all other religious groups. In this way, the ROC stands as the
revered “Bolshoi choir” of religions, itself alone worthy of state
promotion and protection. 1 The immediate implications of this
entente based on mutual self-interest to the exclusion of others are
clear: continued constitutional meltdown and flaunting of the rule of
law by a government unwilling to live up to its people’s vision of
Russia or its international commitments, and an emboldened
xenophobic de facto state church.

1. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad is the Chairman of the Moscow
Patriarchate’s External Church Relations Section. Remarks made during a meeting with a
delegation of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Moscow,
June 22, 2006 (notes on file with author). Kirill drew a similar analogy in a speech at the
enlarged meeting of the leading officials of the Central Federal District, Kursk, 21 July 2004:
It goes without saying that the creative contribution of the Bolshoi Theatre into the
cultural life of Russia differs a priori from the contribution of a local house of
culture, though the Bolshoi and this house of culture are equal as legal entities . . .
the state authorities have the right and moral duty to render assistance to those entities
which determine the cultural level of the country.
Metropolitan Kirill, Chairman, Moscow Patriarchate’s External Church Relations Section,
Principle of Religious Freedom Cannot Be Taken as Absolute, Address Before the Leading
Officials of the Central Federal District, Kursk (July 21, 2004), in 47 EUROPAICA BULLETIN,
Sept. 1, 2004, at http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/47.aspx#7 (emphasis added).
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II. CHURCH & STATE IN SOVIET TIMES: CRUSH AND CONTROL
Many commentators already have covered in great detail the
treatment of religion under Communist rule. 2 Accordingly, this
article only discusses such treatment to the extent that it relates to
the ROC’s current status in Russia today. In contrast to the ROC’s
role as the state church in imperial Russia, the Soviet regime
promised a government free from religious influence. But while
Soviet laws guaranteed religious equality on their face, in reality, the
ROC—in exchange for unflagging support of the communist
regime—managed to retain a certain privileged status despite being
subject to vicious persecution early on.
Notwithstanding the utter lack of governmental intent to uphold
its substance, each consecutive Soviet constitution boasted clear and
relatively progressive provisions related to freedom of conscience.
For example, the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic declared, “For the purpose of securing to
the workers real freedom of conscience, the church is to be separated
from the state and the school from the church, and the right of
religious and anti-religous [sic] propaganda is accorded to every
citizen.” 3
The 1918 Constitution even went so far as to welcome outsiders
seeking protection from religious persecution. It promised, “[t]he
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic offers shelter to all
foreigners who seek refuge from political or religious persecution.” 4
In its next iteration, Article 124 of the 1936 Constitution stated
that “[i]n order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the
church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school
from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of
antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.” 5
2. See, e.g., JOHN ANDERSON, RELIGION, STATE, AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET
UNION AND SUCCESSOR STATES (1994); FELIX CORLEY, RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION:
AN ARCHIVAL READER (1996); STEVEN MERRITT MINER, STALIN’S HOLY WAR: RELIGION,
NATIONALISM, AND ALLIANCE POLITICS, 1941–1945 (University of North Carolina Press,
2003); PAUL MOJZES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR: BEFORE
AND AFTER THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1992); RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE SOVIET
UNION (Sabrina Petra Ramet ed., 1993).
3. Konstitutsiia RSFSR (1918) [RSFSR Constitution] art. 13 (Russ.), available at
http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1918/article2.htm.
4. Id. art. 21.
5. Konstitutsiia USSR (1936) [USSR Constitution] art. 124 (Russ.), available at
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.html#chap10.
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Likewise, the Soviet constitution of 1977 proclaimed similar
protections under Article 52:
Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience,
that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to
conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of
hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited.
In the USSR, the church is separated from the state, and the
school from the church. 6

As with virtually all aspects of Soviet society, however, the
lustrous shine of socialist promise fell far short of the bleak reality. 7
Rather than give meaning to the constitutional safeguards, for over
seventy years Communist authorities undertook a concerted and
vicious campaign of persecution against all religious communities,
including the Russian Orthodox faith. 8 Religious property was either
demolished or confiscated and religious leadership exiled,
imprisoned, or killed. 9 A stark example of this policy came with the
1931 demolition of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, then
Moscow’s largest and tallest building. 10 As Sona Stephan Hoisington
wrote:
There is no evidence that this decision [to raze the Cathedral] was
made on the basis of feasibility. No studies had been conducted, no
advance calculations made. In fact . . . the Directorate of
Construction was still seeking detailed information about the area
more than six weeks after the decision had been made. Clearly the

6. Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [USSR Constitution] art. 52 (Russ.), available at
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons02.html.
7. See, e.g., Robert C. Blitt, “Babushka Said Two Things—It Will Either Rain or Snow;
It Either Will or Will Not”: An Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights Implications of
Russia’s New Law on Nongovernmental Organizations as Told Through Eleven Russian Proverbs,
40 GEO. WASH INT’L L. REV. Part II(A) (forthcoming 2008) (discussing Soviet control over
labor and civil society groups).
8. Daniel L. Schlafly, Jr., Roman Catholicism in Today’s Russia: The Troubled Heritage,
in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTHERN EUROPE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 130 (Derek
H. Davis ed., 2000).
9. According to James Billington, “there were at least 200,000 genuine Christian
martyrs in the Soviet period: priests, deacons and others, lay people who can fairly be said to
have died, not only from the irrationalities and violence of the Soviet system, but for their
faith.” James H. Billington, Orthodoxy and Democracy, 49 J. CHURCH AND ST. 23, 23 (2007).
10. Sona Stephan Hoisington, “Ever Higher”: The Evolution of the Project for the Palace
of Soviets, 62 SLAVIC REV. 41, 46 (2003).
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site was chosen because of its political symbolism. Christ the Savior
was the personification of [czarist] authority in Moscow. 11

Before dynamiting the building, Stalin’s regime took care to first
plunder the cathedral’s valuables, including marble and 1000 pounds
of gold leaf peeled from its five cupolas. 12 The destruction was
“extremely graphic and dramatic, giving it great symbolic resonance.
The demolition of the old church became an integral part of
constructing the new temple to radical social and political change.” 13
In place of the cathedral, Stalin envisioned a “Palace of Soviets,” to
be topped with a gigantic statue of Lenin—the “highest building on
earth, higher than the Great Pyramid of Cheops, higher than
Cologne Cathedral or the Eiffel Tower, taller than the highest
skyscraper in New York.” 14 Ultimately, however, “the Greatest
Building in the World” never materialized. 15 In its place, Nikita
Khrushchev gifted the people of Moscow with an oversized, steamheated swimming pool built on the foundation of the “Palace”
between 1958 and 1960. 16
Setting the tone with this outward approach to religion, the
Soviet government forced virtually all manifestation of religious life
underground. The government even compelled individuals—
including Communist party members (and possibly Mikhail
Gorbachev, the engineer of perestroika and glasnost)—to lead atheist
lives in public and maintain religious rites in secret at their own
peril. 17

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 47.
14. Id. at 65. The article includes photos and sketches of architectural designs for
Stalin’s failed project.
15. Id. at 66. It was “generally thought that Stalin abandoned the project . . . because
the foundation was faulty. . . . It seems much more likely, however, that [he] simply lost
interest in the project.” Id. at 65.
16. Id. at 68. In winter, the heated pool “gave off so much steam that paintings in a
neighboring museum were damaged.” Alan Cooperman, Restoring a Lost Treasure, 117 U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 5, 1994, at 67; see also Susan Marling, Moscow Rebuilt by the Tsars
of Bling, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 16, 2008.
17. “Like many children of the Stalin era, [Gorbachev] was secretly baptised, by his
grandparents. But during his career in the communist party he was—in public, at least—an
atheist.” Luke Harding, When Mikhail Joined the God Squad, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 20, 2008,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/20/russia.religion.
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However, the Soviet government was not satisfied with merely
crushing individual religious freedom; it also sought to violate the
purported constitutional separation of church and state by
infiltrating the ranks of whatever remained of organized religious life.
To this end, the government focused much of its attention on the
ROC. Until 1936, the government denied clergy civil rights on the
basis of their membership in an exploiting class. 18 However,
confronted with the need for popular allegiance in the war against
Nazi Germany, Stalin brought the ROC’s bishops to the Kremlin
and delineated terms that would govern their relationship for the
next fifty years. In short, “there would be no criticism of government
policies by church leaders,” and the “State would control church
institutions and appointments.” 19 In exchange for the ROC “making
an appeal to national patriotic sentiments” to boost support for the
war effort, Stalin “permitted the ‘election’ of a new Patriarch.” 20
From this point forward, “[O]rthodox hierarchs slavishly
supported the government’s foreign and domestic policies.” 21
Stalin’s “understanding,” however, dramatically compromised
church-state separation. The State “allowed the Orthodox Church to
build relations with foreign religious entities [but] exploited the
Orthodox presence on the international religious arena for its own
interests.” 22 By way of the KGB’s control over the ROC’s activities
abroad, the Soviet government ensured, among other things, “that
the World Council of Churches (WCC) consistently adopted
positions advantageous to the Soviet leadership.” 23 Through this
interference and influence, many observers concluded that the KGB
“subverted, penetrated and virtually remade” the ROC “as an arm of

18. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 130.
19. Michael Bourdeaux, President Putin and the Patriarchs, THE TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3172785.ece.
20. Arina Lekhel, Leveling The Playing Field For Religious “Liberty” in Russia: A Critical
Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 167, 179 (1999).
21. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 131.
22. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 179 n.69.
23. Keith Armes, Chekists in Cassocks: The Orthodox Church and the KGB, 1
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA (NO. 4) 72, 73 (1993). Father Gleb Yakunin, a dissident priest defrocked
by the ROC after refusing to give up his seat in parliament, has stated that within the top
Church hierarchy, nine out of ten were KGB agents. Id. at 74; see also Andrew Higgins, Putin
and Orthodox Church Cement Power in Russia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A1.
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the Soviet state,” 24 or that “the Orthodox hierarchy was wholly
under . . . KGB control.” 25 Indeed, the fact that current ROC
Patriarch, Aleksey II, served as a KGB agent for thirty years after
being recruited as a young priest in Estonia in 1958 vividly
demonstrates the extent of KGB infiltration of the ROC and the
degree to which the ROC accepted this infiltration. 26
As noted above, the State forced the ROC into the extremely
uncomfortable position of choosing between foregoing the public
profession of faith and kowtowing to the regime during the period
of Communist rule. In the words of Michael Bourdeaux, “It is
impossible for the outsider to understand the depth of the
humiliation endured by the [C]hurch during the [seventy] years of

24. Sharon LaFraniere, Russia’s Well-Connected Patriarch: As Church Enjoys Revival of
Influence, Its Past Remains Clouded, WASH. POST, May 23, 2002, at A1.
25. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 195 n.156.
26. LaFraniere, supra note 24; see also Michael Bourdeaux, The Complex Face of
Orthodoxy, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 4, 2001, at 18–23, available at
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2099; Seamus Martin, New Russian
Religion Law Harms Minority Churches, IRISH TIMES, OCT. 6, 1997. Dmitri Pospielovsky
challenges the scope of the KGB’s infiltration of the ROC. He argues that KGB handlers
probably filed “boastful reports . . . about the particular worth of the bishop-agents,” and that
none of the reports contained any precise details on the activities of those agents. Dmitri V.
Pospielovsky, The Russian Orthodox Church in Postcommunist CIS, in THE POLITICS OF
RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 41, 51 (Michael Bourdeaux ed.,
1995). Pospielovsky further argues that the KGB probably hand-picked the archived files
released to the public “with some ulterior motive in mind, for example to undermine the
growing respect for religion by discrediting it with KGB connections, thereby continuing the
seven-decades-old struggle against religion by new means.” Id. A KGB report describes
Drozdov’s contribution—Patriarch Aleksey II’s codename—in the following glowing terms:
“He is well-orientated in theoretical questions of theology and the international situation. He
has a willing attitude to the fulfillment of our tasks and has already provided materials
deserving attention.” Bourdeaux, supra, at 18–23. Notably, in 1989 Aleksey II also ran for and
was elected to a seat in the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies. He served in that body
from 1989 to 1991. Leslie L. McGann, The Russian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Aleksii
II and the Russian State: An Unholy Alliance?, 7 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 12, 16 (1999). In a
1991 newspaper interview, Aleksey II acknowledged that he was “sometimes forced to give
way” to Soviet authorities, and apologized for “such concessions, the failure to speak out, the
forced passivity and expressions of loyalty of the [C]hurch leadership.” LaFraniere, supra note
24. In 1992, the Church established a commission to investigate its links to the KGB.
However, no report was ever published. McGann, supra, at 13. Ultimately, even Pospielovsky
concedes that “the continuing lack of information from the Moscow Patriarchate on the
subject of the clergy’s involvement with the KGB does the [C]hurch no good.” Pospielovsky,
supra, at 54. More forcefully, Billington notes, “Some of the [ROC] hierarchy, who became
docile in the face of their atheistic overlords in the Soviet period, have now become
xenophobic nationalists, rather than rise to the level of truth and reconciliation.” Billington,
supra note 9, at 25.
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its captivity under communism.” 27 To be sure, the persecution
exacted on the Church was a far cry from its previously revered
stature in Russia’s history. Prior to Communism, the ROC’s mission
had long been “organically linked with Russia’s ethnic and national
identity,” 28 ensuring the “survival of Holy Russia and the attainment
of a special place for its heritage among nations.” 29 For example,
Orthodoxy helped unify the Russian people in confronting the
Mongols, thus facilitating a close-knit relationship early on between
the ROC and government leaders. 30 Up to 1917, and probably
throughout the communist era, the ROC saw itself as “the
embodiment of the Russian national tradition, the core of the
Russian national identity, and the guardian of the psychological wellbeing of the nation.” 31 The Church itself boasts that “the longstanding culture of the Russian people . . . includes a thousand years
of worship of God according to the Orthodox way.” 32 As one
observer has summarized, the ROC’s uniqueness stems from its
“unrivaled degree of respect and legitimacy as the embodiment of
Russia’s spiritual past and [its investment] with a national historic
tradition that carries great mythical power.” 33
And yet, tied up in this history, inclusive of the Communist
period, is the ROC’s continual willingness, as during czarist times, to
use the State for its own purposes, in exchange for offering religious
sanction of the State’s policies 34 and acknowledging political leaders
“as God’s chosen sovereigns.” 35 As Marina Gaskova confirms, the
ROC has always been affiliated with the secular political power. It
27. Bourdeaux, supra note 26, at 18–23.
28. Shima Baradaran-Robison et al., Religious Monopolies and the Commodification of
Religion, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 885, 913 (quoting Schlafly, supra note 8, at 137).
29. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 181.
30. William J. Kovatch, Jr., All Religions Are Equal, But Some Are More Equal Than
Others: Russia’s 1997 Restrictive Law of Religious Practices, 6 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 416, 421
(1998).
31. Marat S. Shterin & James T. Richardson, Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia:
Precursors of Russia’s New National Law, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NORTHERN EUROPE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 144 (Derek H. Davis ed., 2000). This article contains a
detailed discussion of the situation governing religious freedom in the period between 1990
and 1997, particularly related to local regulation.
32. Baradaran-Robison, supra note 28, at 913–14 (quoting Schlafly, supra note 8, at
138).
33. McGann, supra note 26, at 12.
34. Bourdeaux, supra note 26.
35. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 128.
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has no “tradition of independent functioning, independent
development, [or] of struggle for human rights, for liberty or
freedom,” 36 but rather “only a history of loyalty and glorification of
the rulers.” 37 Unlike other religious groups, including Baptists and
Pentecostals, that refused to register with the Soviet authorities and
preserved their faith by meeting secretly, only the ROC acceded to
the direct control and oversight of the State. Referring to this
relationship in 1927, ROC Patriarch Sergey proclaimed, “[T]he
‘joys’ of the Soviet [S]tate were its joys, and the ‘sorrows’ of the
Soviet [S]tate were its sorrows.” 38 This pattern of linkage is so deeply
embedded that Aleksey II has determined that “the revival of Russia
. . . is impossible without reviving the Orthodox faith.” 39
Importantly, it may be argued that this symbiotic relationship has
been responsible for nurturing “strong reactionary and anti-liberal
tendencies” 40 in the ROC as a means of preserving its protected
status against others and silencing perceived threats associated with
competing ideas. 41 Indeed, coupled with the willingness to stand in
lockstep with the State is the ROC’s long history of xenophobia in
the face of “infidels” and “foreigners.” This fear of others is a
constantly reappearing theme marked by numerous milestones,
including ROC lobbying in 1652 to force all foreigners in Moscow
to move into a zone of foreign settlement outside the city “to
minimize contamination by Western Christians.” 42
To better understand the dynamics of the relationship between
the ROC and the Russian government—particularly during the
Communist era—it is instructive to consider by way of analogy the
36. Marina Gaskova, The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping the Political
Culture of Russia, 7 J. FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES 110, 111 (2004).
37. Id. at 116.
38. Wallace L. Daniel & Christopher Marsh, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience in Context and Retrospect, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 5, 8 (2007); see also John B.
Dunlop, The Russian Orthodox Church as an “Empire Saving” Institution, in THE POLITICS OF
RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 15, 19 (Michael Bourdeaux ed.,
1995) (quoting “the ‘joys and sorrows of the [communist] Motherland’ were those of the
Russian [C]hurch.”); infra note 199 (discussing origin of term sergeyism).
39. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 137.
40. Gaskova, supra note 36, at 116.
41. The ROC’s reactionary nature can be seen in its highest echelons. For example,
Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg and Ladoga consistently espoused notoriously antiSemitic views without opposition or censure from the ROC hierarchy, including Patriarch
Aleksey. McCann, supra note 26, at 14.
42. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 128.
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behavior of a battered spouse trapped in a cycle of violence. Similar
to a battered spouse, the Church was confronted by a situation of
mounting tension with an abuser who increasingly craved power and
control in the relationship. “Ultimately, there is an explosion or
battering incident” during which the abuser is “likely to have
actually experienced a physiological release of tension.” This phase is
followed by a “honeymoon” or “loving and contrite” stage where
the abuser is “willing to try anything to make up.” 43 Like the
battered spouse, the Church had its own reasons for staying in the
relationship, whether it stemmed from a desire to protect itself “from
even worse destruction under the Communists,” 44 a belief or false
hope that the relationship would improve over time, or a loyalty to
an idealized vision, for example the traditional church-state
arrangement alluded to above. 45 Interestingly, this victim mentality
persists and may be indicative of the syndrome still in play today.
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, Deputy Chairman of the Moscow
Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations, has
commented that “[w]e don’t consider that everything which was
done in that Soviet period was incorrect . . . . To reject Soviet power
as something totally bad, and to blame someone just for being in
good touch with Soviet authorities, I think is a highly politicized
approach.” 46

43. Lenore Walker, Dynamics of Domestic Violence—The Cycle of Violence,
http://www.enddomesticviolence.com/include/content/filehyperlink/holder/The%20Cycle
%20of%20Violence.doc (last visited Aug. 13, 2008). It is useful to recall here the deal struck
with Stalin to garner ROC support during WWII. See supra text accompanying note 19.
44. Peter Juviler, Religious Human Rights: Constitution, Law, and Practice in Post-Soviet
Russia, in PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW IN RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF A UNIFIED LEGAL AND
POLITICAL SPACE 225, 231 (Robert Sharlet & Ferdinand Feldbrugge eds., 2005). Reverend
Chaplin has claimed that the “archives of Soviet institutions . . . shed light on the tremendous
efforts—unknown to the world—hierarchs and clergy of the Russian Church made to guard
the faithful against the repressions carried out by the godless totalitarian regime.” RadicalLiberal View on Human Rights Is Not the Sole Possible Opinion, INTERFAX, Apr. 5, 2006,
http://www.pravmir.com/printer_86.html. [hereinafter Radical-Liberal].
45. See, e.g., Partners Healthcare Employee Assistance Program, Who We Are,
http://www.eap.partners.org/WorkLife/Domestic_Abuse/Why_do_Women_stay/Why_do_
Women_stay_in_Abusive_Relationships.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2008).
46. LaFraniere, supra note 24, at A1. Reverend Chaplin reiterated his view of the Soviet
era when the ROC announced support for Putin’s decision to incorporate into Russia’s
national anthem music used in the Soviet version: “I think that the president has made a very
worthy decision . . . . Alexandrov’s music, which shows continuity with the Soviet era, in
which, of course, there were terrible tragedies, but there were also a lot of good things.”
Andrei Zolotov Jr., Russian Orthodox Church Approves as Putin Decides to Sing to a Soviet
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What for certain does emerge from this historical perspective is
the consistent, if fluid, symbiosis between church and state in
Russia. 47 Historically, each institution cosseted the other to the
extent allowable or dictated by the circumstances of the day. Despite
enduring persecution and suffering, the Church maintained a
preeminence of place against other religions because of its
collaboration with the Soviet regime. 48 In this way, the ROC
ensured its influence and sway in relevant questions of state to the
greatest extent possible. Indicative of this steady pattern of deference
and collaboration, as late as 1988, Patriarch Pimem expressed his
view that “[t]he children of the [ROC] who are citizens of the
Soviet Union live in the context of a society whose program . . . is
characterized by an elevated humanism, and thus close to Christian
ideals.” 49 Up until the demise of the Communist enterprise, the
ROC’s practical alliance with the State—if permitting any
institutional independence at all—pressed the Church to grow ever
compliant in the face of chronic meddling in its internal affairs, even
to the point of adopting doctrinal adjustments to legitimize its
relationship with a dominant state. 50
III. A RETURN TO (LESS ABUSIVE) SYMBIOSIS OR A CLEAN SLATE?
OPEN SEASON FOR REDEFINING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN
POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA
A. From Communism to Freedom: A New Opportunity for Russia or a
Threat to ROC Influence?
This section traces the emerging dynamics of the church-state
relationship in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and
specifically during the tumultuous years of Russia’s post-Communist
legal and constitutional development. Notably, the ROC remained
standing after all other centralized Soviet institutions—with the

Tune, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Dec. 1, 2000, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2000/
decemberweb-only/57.0.html.
47. Bourdeaux, supra note 26; see also Gaskova, supra note 36, at 116.
48. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 181.
49. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 131 (emphasis added).
50. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 181.
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exception of the State’s security apparatus—collapsed. 51 Even as
transitional uncertainty and instability enveloped Russia, the ROC
gradually began flexing its partially atrophied muscles with the
objective of recovering its rightful place in whatever new political
reality came to settle in the Kremlin. 52 For example, during the 1988
millennium celebration of the Christianization of Russia, an
independent meeting organized by a liberal wing of the Orthodox
Church was shut down not once, but twice. First, government
agents closed the venue “under the pretext of fire law violations,”
and then, after relocating, regular police and the KGB simply broke
up the gathering. 53 The following day, the meeting’s organizer
speculated that the disruption likely stemmed from a government
agreement with the ROC “to eliminate any possible independent
side shows during the Millennium” celebration. 54
Despite this incident, in transitioning away from Communist-era
style government, Mikhail Gorbachev carried ‘openness’ in religious
freedom to a level unprecedented since the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution. By 1988, religious life in Russia had its first taste of
revival, soon bolstered by two important laws passed in 1990. The
laws “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organizations” 55
and “On Freedom of Worship” prohibited religious discrimination
and established a foundation for religious liberty and separation of
church and state in Russia. 56 Shterin and Richardson have observed
that in some respects the 1990 law enshrined principles “very similar

51. Armes, supra note 23, at 72. Georgy Edelshtein, a dissident priest, has called the
Moscow Patriarchate “the last Soviet institution.” Victoria Pope, God and Man in Russia, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2, 1992, at 54.
52. Metropolitan Kirill himself recently used this analogy in the context of the ROC’s
confrontation against foreign missionaries: “We were like a boxer who walks around for
months with his arm in a cast and is then abruptly shoved into the ring, accompanied by shouts
of encouragement. But there we encountered a well-trained opponent, in the form of a wide
variety of missionaries . . . .” Spiegel Online International, Interview with Russian Orthodox
Metropolitan Kyrill: The Bible Calls it a Sin, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,527618-2,00.html.
53. Juviler, supra note 44, at 225.
54. Id. This incident is also cited as evidence that what “had been a coerced cooperation
between the ROC and government under communism slid into a developing collaboration.”
Id. at 229.
55. The 1990 law has been described as going “beyond everyone’s expectations in
proclaiming total freedom of religion.” Michael Bourdeaux, The New Russian Law On
Religion: A View From the Regions, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 139, 140 (1999).
56. Gaskova, supra note 36, at 118.
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to the American model of church-state relationships: the principles of
nonestablishment, strict separation between church and state, and
equality of all religions before the law.” 57 Nevertheless, it could just
as easily be said that the law mirrored previous Soviet constitutional
declarations, as evidenced in the discussion above. 58 In fact, the only
potential difference between these two models rested not on
principles, but rather on the questions of implementation and
enforcement. In other words, would the 1990 laws (and soon
thereafter the 1993 Constitution) actually result in separation of
church and state and freedom of religion, or would they promote
these ideals only in the abstract?
The promise of the 1990 laws posed an immediate problem for
the ROC, as it complicated the organization’s primary objective.
Rather than focus on rebuilding itself and securing anew its favored
status vis-a-vis whatever government rose from the tumult of
transition, the ROC was instead forced to “compete” against other
religious groups in the “free marketplace” of ideas now open to all
Russians. As one Church insider observed, “[A] great many Russians
are ignorant of Russian Orthodoxy or indifferent to it. But their
roots are Orthodox. It is our task to return them to Orthodoxy.” 59
Although new legislation began the process of transferring
sequestered properties back to the Church, outreach and rebuilding
activities proceeded against the backdrop of competition from other
domestic and foreign religious groups that were likewise seeking out
the “great many Russians” 60 who, while perhaps ignorant or
indifferent to religion, might be curious and open to hearing more. 61

57. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 31, at 142.
58. Admittedly, the United States was first “to construct a constitutional framework that
officially sanctioned the separation of church and state as a means of guaranteeing religious
liberty.” Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right:
Examining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 2002 BYU L. REV. 217, 222.
59. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 195 n.155.
60. Id.
61. See MEMBERS OF THE SPEAKER’S ADVISORY GROUP ON RUSSIA, 106TH CONG.,
RUSSIA’S ROAD TO CORRUPTION: HOW THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION EXPORTED
GOVERNMENT INSTEAD OF FREE ENTERPRISE AND FAILED THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE (Sept.
2000) (noting that “[r]eligious faith has sharply increased since the collapse of the Soviet
Union,” and that “in a remarkably brief period of time, Russia has become one of the most
God-believing countries in Europe”), available at http://www.fas.org/news/russia/
2000/russia/part12.htm (citations omitted).
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B. If I Had a Hammer and a Restrictive Law (and a License to
Import Tobacco Duty-Free): Church Efforts to Rebuild Post-1990
After the fall of communism, the ROC focused on rebuilding its
infrastructure both as a visible means of reasserting its place in
Russian culture and competing against the growing activism of other
religious groups operating in Russia. This preoccupation with
rebuilding infrastructure reveals a measure of success. Since 1987,
the ROC reopened over 6000 churches, and as of 2007, it
maintained 142 dioceses, 732 monasteries and convents, and almost
28,000 parishes in Russia and abroad. 62 Impressively, the number of
monasteries multiplied thirty-two times, and by 2008, 15,000 young
people had immersed themselves in the study of Orthodox
theology. 63 A casual observer of construction projects in Russia in
1992 would be surprised to learn of the ROC’s claimed financial
hardship and struggle to match the activities of other religious
groups. Perhaps most visibly, the Church successfully lobbied
President Yeltsin to place the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ
the Savior first on the list of building projects for Moscow. 64 In the
same manner that Stalin sought to transmit a strong signal by
dynamiting the original structure, the ROC intended the rebuilding
from the ground up of the twenty-five-story cathedral certainly to
carry a message of equal magnitude.
That the massive, multi-year project to rebuild the cathedral was
undertaken—at least in part—with public funds, 65 however, raises a
number of troubling concerns: first, it brings into sharp relief the
dubious logic of the ROC’s singular preoccupation in the first years
following the collapse of Communism with rebuilding physical
infrastructure; and second, given the ROC’s early ability to access
government subsidies to the exclusion of other religious groups, it

62. Lyudmila Alexandrova, Russian Church Says Satisfied with Results of Activity in
2007, ITAR-TASS, Dec. 25, 2007.
63. See Spiegel Online International, supra note 52.
64. The Cathedral of Christ the Savior, The Stages of Reconstruction: Reconstruction
(1990–2000), http://www.xxc.ru/english/reconst/stage/index.htm (noting that the
rebuilding was brought into effect by the decree on “The Establishment of a Fund for the
Recreation of Moscow”).
65. The ROC continues to accept donations to further refurbish the cathedral,
including “recreating unique jewelry utensil [sic] made of precious metal and gem stones.”
The Cathedral of Christ the Savior, How You Can Help, http://www.xxc.ru/
english/donation/index.htm.

721

BLITT. FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/2/2008 7:10 PM

[2008

raises doubts about how the “open market” of religious freedom
actually discriminated against the ROC.
Also noteworthy here is the fact that the Russian government
granted the ROC—to the exclusion of other religious groups—
permission to import duty-free tobacco and liquor for sale directly to
the public as a source of Church revenue. 66 Further, the government
allegedly unlawfully diverted public funds into additional Church
building projects. 67 Even today, the ROC refuses to disclose how
much income it garnered from tax-free cigarette sales and other
related activities. 68
For the ROC, however, government support in the construction
realm and financial compensation schemes alone were insufficient
payback. A recurrent claim among ROC officials and supporters was
that the Church simply lacked the resources to compete against
Western missionaries, who were invariably better funded.
Consequently, the ROC reasoned that state protection was
warranted. 69 Alexander Dvorkin, a ROC functionary and crusader
against “totalitarian” sects, argued, “[t]he competition between the
Orthodox Church and the sects is unfair—the forces are uneven

66. McGann, supra note 26, at 19; see also Martin, supra note 26. The Church’s
willingness to profit from the sale of tobacco and alcohol makes the hypocrisy of its recent
criticism of Damskaya (“Ladies”), a vodka exclusively targeting women drinkers, particularly
glaring. According to Archpriest Chaplin, the marketing effort is “a very dubious step from the
moral point of view.” The Russian Orthodox Church Considers New Damskaya Vodka for
Women Morally Dubious, INTERFAX, Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.interfax-religion
.com/?act=news&div=4434. For a contrasting perspective of empowerment, positing that
Damskaya “is indicative of a changing dynamic in relations between men and women” in
Russia due to women gaining newfound financial independence, see The Age, Vodka Takes a
Shot at Russian Women, Mar. 30, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/
03/29/1206207493274.html.
67. Paul Glastris, A Mixed Blessing for the New Russia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
16, 1996, at 47.
68. LaFraniere, supra note 24. The Kremlin granted the ROC this import privilege
partly as compensation, with a value estimated at between $75 and $100 million. The Church
also acquired a 40 percent stake in MES, an oil-export company with 1996 revenue estimated
at $2 billion. The Yeltsin government canceled the cigarette concession in late 1996 and the
Church lost MES as a source of income when it closed two years later. “Now, the [C]hurch
survives partly on a bottled water business and contributions from wealthy enterprises,”
including state industries such as Gazprom and Lukoil. Id. Kirill has claimed “[w]ealthy private
citizens . . . pay for almost all of the [C]hurch’s social programs.” Spiegel Online International,
supra note 52.
69. The Church “faced an increased competition from foreign missionaries who were
experienced and possessed considerable resources for mass evangelization.” Lekhel, supra note
20, at 196.
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from the outset. The sects can buy TV time, plus they use dishonest
forms of recruitment.” 70 Comments regarding the activities of a
Catholic missionary group in The Missionary Observer, an official
ROC publication, are particularly revealing and reinforce the
continuing xenophobic character of the Church: “[The mission’s
leader] is not the first missionary from abroad who tries to seduce
children in such a way. Rock music is playing in the mission and
children are doing there what they want. Pedagogical anarchism is a
frightening phenomenon and here it flourishes.” 71
The report goes on to describe the group as “two arms of an
octopus” enveloping the Russian Orthodox heartland. “They take
our children to a small Disneyland, a trap of cunning devilry.” 72 In
the ROC’s own language: “These [sectarian] views destroy the
traditional organization of life that has been formed under the
influence of the [ROC]. They destroy the spiritual and moral ideal
that is common to all of us; and they threaten the integrity of our
national consciousness and our cultural identity.” 73
Thus, above and beyond import licenses and state support for
construction efforts, in the face of the liberal 1990 laws the ROC

70. Id. at 196 n.159. Dvorkin also served as an expert witness for the Russian
prosecution in its case against the Jehovah Witnesses, testifying to the “mafia-like” nature of
sects. Mikhail Gokhman, Are All Sects Totalitarian?, Feb. 6, 1997, http://
religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/relfreerep/cis98.html#14b; see also Charlotte Wallace, The
Jehovah’s Witnesses Case: Testing the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations” and the Russian Legal Process, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 39, 57 (2001) (discussing
the “mafia-like” nature of sects).
71. The missionary group in question, Pro Deo et Fratibus, ran a mission for children
from poor families in the Yaroslaval region of Russia. David Hearst, Orthodoxy Raises Barriers,
THE OBSERVER, Dec. 15, 1996, at 8.
72. Id.
73. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 31, at 333 n.48 (quoting The Council [Sobor] of
the Archbishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, Art. 9, Dec. 1994, unpublished).
Apparently, while the ROC adamantly opposes missionary groups appealing to Russian
citizens, it is quite acceptable for the ROC itself to “destroy the traditional organization of life
that has been formed” outside of Russia. In a move ripe with irony and underscoring the depth
of the ROC’s hypocrisy, elements within the [C]hurch have called publicly for the Moscow
Patriarchate to “begin actively preaching among the Russian-speaking Jews of Israel.” In the
words of Deacon Andrey Kuraev, “This is a unique missionary opportunity—we could bring
the light of the New Testament to Israel through Jews who are brought up on the European
and Russian classics.” Strangely absent from Kuraev’s missionary zeal is any concern for
destroying “the spiritual and moral ideal” of another state or threatening the integrity of its
national consciousness and cultural identity. Israel Is a Special Field for Missionary Activity of
the Church, the Famous Russian Cleric Said, INTERFAX, May 5, 2008, http://www.interfaxreligion.com/print.php?act=news&id=4635.

723

BLITT. FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/2/2008 7:10 PM

[2008

demanded nothing less than state protection against what it termed
an “invasion” of foreign faiths and peoples that threatened the fabric
of Russian society. 74 By June 1993, Patriarch Aleksey II had thrown
his considerable weight behind support for an amendment to the law
“On Freedom of Conscience” that would impose restrictions on
“non-traditional” religious organizations, weaken guarantees for
equal treatment for all believers, extend fundamental human rights
protection only to Russian citizens, and entrench favored treatment
on the ROC. 75 He even distributed a letter to all members of the
Supreme Soviet, Russia’s legislative body at that time, urging their
support for the legislation. 76 Shortly thereafter, the legislature
successfully passed the amendment. 77 Not content to rest after
having won over the Supreme Soviet, the Patriarch met with
President Boris Yeltsin days later to urge him to sign the amended
law. 78 Yeltsin refused, concluding that the amendments contradicted
Russia’s legal agreements and compromised the “equal right of
individuals to enjoy freedom of conscience and religion . . .
regardless of their possession of Russian citizenship.” 79 Instead, he
returned the measure to the Supreme Soviet with requests for
revisions. 80 Shortly thereafter, Yeltsin took steps to dissolve the
Supreme Soviet legislature and momentum around the amendment
effort came to a halt, at least temporarily.
In simplest terms, the ROC had choices to make and priorities to
order after 1990. It also clearly had access to necessary funding. But
rather than direct funds to outreach, including buying “TV time”
and creating “small Disneylands,” the Church instead opted to focus
on lavish and expensive construction projects. 81 To address the
74. The Church continued to employ this type of terminology. According to Patriarch
Aleksey II, “Both foreign sects and missionaries view Russia as an open field . . . . This is a
form of expansion to the East, and it is comparable to NATO’s expansion to the East.” Dmitry
Zaks, Yeltsin Faces Pressure Over Bill on Religion, THE MOSCOW TIMES, July 22, 1997.
75. W. Cole Durham, Jr. et al., The Future of Religious Liberty in Russia: Report of the
De Burght Conference on Pending Russian Legislation Restricting Religious Liberty, 8 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
76. Id. at 9.
77. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 197.
78. Durham, supra note 75, at 10.
79. Id.
80. Id. (providing a detailed account of Yeltsin’s reaction to the 1993 bill).
81. Some critics also question the Church’s ability to fill the pews with worshippers once
buildings are returned, rebuilt, or rehabilitated. Fred Weir, Russia’s Orthodox Church Regains
Lost Ground, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 14, 2007, at 6.
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“invasion” of foreign missionaries and religious groups, the ROC
relied on political pressure rather than cash. Viewed from this
perspective, the ROC’s arguments that it lacked institutional
structures for supporting proselytism and religious education, or that
it could not compete against experienced and well-funded foreign
missionaries 82 starts to lose traction.
That said, the ROC was not alone in seeing value in rebuilding
the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. President Yeltsin and Yuri
Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, both recognized the political
capital to be gained from supporting the project and were on hand
to cement the final bricks in the new cathedral’s main entrance. 83 At
least one Russian television documentary reasoned that Yeltsin’s and
Luzhkov’s endorsement of the cathedral’s construction was primarily
aimed at garnering support for the 1996 presidential elections.
According to journalist Leonid Parfyonov, “Our political authorities
. . . are trying to look more Orthodox than the [P]atriarch.” 84
McGann similarly concludes that the construction effort represented
“a political endeavor,” “a symbol of Orthodoxy’s value, and Aleksy’s
prowess, in the political sphere” rather than anything spiritual. 85 In
other words, the symbiosis between church and state evidenced signs
of being alive and well, in a honeymoon phase again, to recall the
analogy of the battered spouse used above.
Despite the ROC’s failure to secure amendments to the 1990
law, a flurry of other developments—some perhaps trifling, others
not—conspired to undermine the foundation of Russia’s new-found
religious freedom. In 1990, Patriarch Aleksey publicly blessed Yeltsin
before he embarked on his first election campaign. Yeltsin
subsequently called Aleksey up to the dais during his 1991 swearingin ceremony to offer another blessing. 86 As early as 1993, scholars
questioned the ROC’s steady support of government measures to
combat anti-Yeltsin forces, censor the media, and restrict political
freedoms. 87 For instance, the Church opted only for vague appeals to

82. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 195–96.
83. In April 1996, Patriarch Aleksey II conducted the first service in the partially
completed cathedral. President Yeltsin, members of the Cabinet of Ministers and Mayor
Luzhkov attended. The Cathedral of Christ the Savior, supra note 65.
84. Cooperman, supra note 16, at 67.
85. McGann, supra note 26, at 20.
86. Pope, supra note 51.
87. McGann, supra note 26, at 17.
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have “the courage to forgive the offender” in the face of Russia’s
military intervention in Chechnya. 88 Less than two months later, this
ambivalent position morphed into an enthusiastic call from the ROC
to Russia’s young men to join the army and to defend the
motherland, 89 leaving the distinct impression that, only four years
after the collapse of Communism, the relationship between church
and state was again one of “quid-pro-quo.” 90
During the 1996 presidential election, Boris Yeltsin reached out
to the ROC for the benefit of his campaign. With TV cameras
rolling, Yeltsin visited local churches, lit candles, and made public
appearances with Patriarch Aleksey II. 91 Further, although Russia’s
election law prohibited political appearances on the last day of the
presidential campaign, Yeltsin decided to take a stroll outside the
Kremlin together with Aleksey II. In front of TV cameras and
gawking locals, Aleksey, clearly intending to communicate support
for Yeltsin’s candidacy, opined, “Please make the right choice
tomorrow . . . [b]ecause tomorrow the fate of Russia shall be
determined.” 92
To be sure, this unfolding church-state dynamic was not simply a
heavy-handed, one-way street as during Communist times. Rather
the scales indicated an all too easy return to the symbiosis of the preCommunist era, a balance characterized by partnership and mutual
benefit. Indeed, while Yeltsin was off campaigning, the Patriarch
enjoyed “a suite of offices at the Kremlin,” a benefit not enjoyed by
the ROC since czarist times. 93 In McCann’s words:

88. Id. at 18 (quoting Interview by Natalie Zhelnorova with Aleksey II, Patriarch,
ROC, in Natalie Zhelnorova, Patriarkh: Ne vsiakomu dukhu ver’te, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY,
Aug. 17 1995, at 3).
89. McGann, supra note 26, at 18. Yuri Feofanov, longtime legal correspondent for
Isvestia, goes further, concluding that Aleksey’s statement “was expressly designed to assist the
government in its conscription effort and constituted a dangerous entreaty to Russia’s young
men to fuse the services that Christ had once urged man to render separately, unto Caesar and
unto God.” Id.
90. Vicki L. Hesli et al., The Patriarch and the President: Religion and Political Choice in
Russia, 7 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 42, 49 (1999).
91. Glastris, supra note 67.
92. Lee Hockstader, Yeltsin Makes Last-Minute Pitch; As Polls Prepare to Open in Vote,
Church Head Cites “Right Choice,” WASH. POST, June 16, 1996, at A27; see also McGann,
supra note 26, at 20.
93. Glastris, supra note 67. Yeltsin’s campaign managers considered showcasing a priest
in their advertisements, but retreated for fear the strategy “might back-fire and play into the
hands of the opposition, since the [C]hurch is not supposed to officially be involved in
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[The Yeltsin administration] had ample reason to seek an alliance
with the church as a highly respected institution, to boost its
support base through the highly publicized mutual association. On
the other hand, [Aleksey’s] church has been supporting Yeltsin
because he has been generous both in building the church’s
political status . . . and in facilitating its growth as a religious
institution. 94

In another showing of the ROC’s prominence in Russian
politics, Yeltsin once again invited Aleksey to attend the presidential
inauguration, this time in direct conflict with the freshly minted
1993 Constitution. According to this document, the oath of the
President of the Russian Federation is “taken in a solemn
atmosphere in the presence of members of the Council of the
Federation, deputies of the State Duma and judges of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.” 95 Notably, this
provision fails to provide a non-restrictive term such as “including,”
which would presuppose a non-exhaustive list under traditional
constitutional interpretive rules. Moreover, no further provision is
made for attendance or blessings by religious organizations or
leadership; rather, the ceremony is defined as a solemn event that, if
not expressly secular in nature, at least makes no provision for
religious participation. Further, the decision to invite Aleksey to
speak on behalf of all ‘traditional’ religions, thus effectively excluding
these other groups from equal participation, likewise signaled a
violation of Article 14 of the new Constitution. 96 To be sure, the
constitutional violation exhibited by Yeltsin’s inaugural planners
would not be the last violation condoned by governments to follow.

politics.” McGann, supra note 26, at 20 (quoting Mikhail Margelov, producer of Yeltsin’s
political ads, as quoted in Alessandra Stanley, Church Leans Toward Yeltsin in Russian Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1996, at A1). Things were different in Moscow: Mayor Luzhkov, a cochairman of the Yeltsin campaign, endorsed giant billboards across the city featuring images of
Yeltsin and Luzhkov “shaking hands against the glittering gold and white backdrop of the
Kremlin’s Ioann Lestivichnik church and belfry. Above it, the logo reads, ‘Moscovites have
already made their choice.’” McGann, supra note 26, at 20.
94. McGann, supra note 26, at 22.
95. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Constitution] art. 82(2) (Russ.). This point is
also made by McGann, supra note 26, at 21.
96. Juviler, supra note 44, at 231.
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C. On the 1993 Constitution
Despite the ROC’s profound opposition, the principles
enunciated in the 1990 religion laws ultimately became enshrined in
the 1993 Constitution, a document endorsed by a majority of the
Russian people through a public consultation. 97 Scholars describe
this Constitution as a “mixed document” that draws on “AngloAmerican, continental European, and Russian constitutional
traditions,” resulting in a “collision of legal cultures.” 98 Yet with
respect to rights related to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion or belief, the Constitution successfully embodied
international standards as envisioned in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 99 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights rather than any culturally-specific tradition. 100
Consider Article 28 of Russia’s Constitution: “Everyone is
guaranteed the freedom of conscience, freedom of religious worship,
including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any
religion, or to profess no religion, to freely choose, possess and
disseminate religious or other beliefs, and to act in conformity with
them.” 101
Though not required under international standards, the 1993
Russian Constitution included a provision mandating separation of
church and state. Article 14 of the Constitution proclaimed, “1. The
Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be instituted as
state-sponsored or mandatory. 2. Religious associations are separated
from the [S]tate, and are equal before the law.” 102 One critic of this
97. According to statistics from Russia’s Central Electoral Commission, 54.8 percent of
Russia’s 106 million voters cast ballots on December 12, 1993. In response to the question
“Do you support the adoption of the new constitution of Russia?” 58.4 percent voted “Yes” in
favor of adoption. There is some debate over whether the voting was in actuality a
“referendum” or something less since it did not comply with the Referendum Law of 1990.
Timothy J. Colton, Introduction: The 1993 Election and the New Russian Politics, in GROWING
PAINS: RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE ELECTION OF 1993, at 16, 21 (Timothy J. Colton &
Jerry F. Hough eds., 1998).
98. Christopher Marsh & Daniel P. Payne, The Globalization of Human Rights and the
Socialization of Human Rights Norms, 2007 BYU L. REV. 665, 681.
99. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
18, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR].
101. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Constitution] art. 28 (Russ.).
102. Id. art. 14.
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provision, Nikolas Gvosdev, argues that the term svetskoe gosudarstvo
(translated here as ‘secular state’), “carries with it not the
understanding of secular as ‘religiously neutral’ but rather the
connotation of ‘temporal.’” In other words, the Constitution only
requires that the “[S]tate does not interfere in matters of the
[C]hurch . . . and concerns itself with temporal, earthly matters.” In
Gvosdev’s view, this limitation does not require “that society as a
whole [remains] religiously neutral. Instead, society can express its
preferences in religious matters through non-governmental
means.” 103
More provocatively, Gvosdev reasons that the “very phrasing” of
the Constitution’s “individual religious liberty” provisions (Article
28), “couched in terms of Western individualism[,] . . . clashes with
deeply-rooted historical and constitutional attitudes in Russia itself
with regard to how ‘religious freedom’ is to be understood and
applied.” 104 Thus he pleads: “Whenever possible, those working for
religious freedom should avoid citing Western (especially American)
precedents or international treaties when framing their arguments, so
as to avoid giving the impression that they are advocating positions
that are not in harmony with established Russian laws and
constitutional traditions.” 105
There is no indication in the literature of any support for
Gvosdev’s interpretation of Article 14 of the Constitution, nor can
such evidence be found in decisions of Russia’s Constitutional
Court. In essence, Gvosdev’s plea is merely a relativist assertion for
Russian exceptionalism in the face of what are, in actuality, domestic,
regional and international standards to which the Russian
government (backed by a majority of Russians) has bound itself
willingly. 106 It is staggering to contemplate a request for human

103. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Religious Freedom: Russian Constitutional Principles—
Historical and Contemporary, 2001 BYU L. REV. 511, 516.
104. Id. at 522. It is worth noting that “as many as one-third of the nations of the world
include formal guarantees of church-state separation in their constitutions.” Davis, supra note
58, at 223.
105. Gvosdev, supra note 103, at 534.
106. Consider, for example, Abdullahi An-Naim’s plea regarding human rights in Muslim
states: “I conclude that human rights advocates in the Muslim world must work within the
framework of Islam to be effective.” Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim
World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15
(1990) (emphasis added). Even though An-Na’im proceeds by taking “the International Bill of
Human Rights as the source of [universal] standards,” he still argues for a strategy that hinders
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rights activists and religious groups (both outside and inside Russia)
to forego the use of citation to international treaties, since such a
step—however useful for minimizing scrutiny of conditions related
to freedom of religion in Russia—would surely undermine the very
object and purpose of those treaties. More precisely, the argument
that the principles enshrined in such treaties as the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention) are “Western,” is of no merit in
the face of Russia’s willingness to adopt, ratify, and benefit from such
treaties. 107
Given this context, this article proceeds with a more
conventional understanding of Article 14—and for that matter, with
all the rights provisions contained in the 1993 Constitution. This
understanding is grounded on plain text meaning and compliance
with Russia’s regional and international commitments. Significantly,
such an approach is harmonious with the guidance provided by the
1993 Constitution itself. Article 15(4) provides:
The universally recognized principles and norms of the
international law and the international treaties of the Russian
Federation are a component part of its legal system. If an
international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules
than those established by the law, the rules of the international
treaty shall apply. 108

the invocation of key international instruments and constrains the legitimacy of outside
scrutiny:
I urge human rights advocates to claim the Islamic platform and not concede it to
the traditionalist and fundamentalist forces in their societies. I would also invite
outside supporters of Muslim human rights advocates to express their support with
due sensitivity and genuine concern for Islamic legitimacy in the Muslim world.
Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
107. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) amended by E.T.S.
No. 155, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf. Russia ratified the European Convention on
May 5, 1998. And yet this view continues to be espoused by various commentators. For
example, a recent op-ed argues, inter alia, “To criticize Russian society, including the
resurgence of the Orthodox Church, by using post-Enlightenment Western European
arguments is not only out of context, but also likely to reinforce Russia’s paranoia reflex.”
Vladimir Berezansky Jr., Nothing Weird About Orthodox Tradition, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 29,
2008.
108. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Constitution] art. 15(4) (Russ.).
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This understanding of Russia’s constitutional text still does not
fully resolve the breakdown in Russia’s separation of church and
state. In fact, this breakdown may signal a need for constitutional
amendments to validate the de facto scenario that has emerged in the
past fifteen years. While international law is silent on the legitimacy
of a nation’s decision to establish a state religion, such a
constitutionally affirmed endorsement may be necessary in the face
of continued undermining of the principles contained in Articles 14
and 28. As will be argued below, without such a step, the Russian
President will continue to fall short of his Article 80 constitutional
duty to serve as the guarantor of the Constitution and “of the rights
of man and citizen.” 109
Moreover, the passage of the 1993 Constitution failed to resolve
the challenges put to the Russian legislation on freedom of religion
in 1993. The same actors that prompted the 1993 amendment effort
did not disappear. In fact, they only gained traction and increased
influence over a four-year period before returning with the same
demand: 110 namely, that “new” religious movements be restrained
and that the ROC alone be empowered as Russia’s “spiritual
shield.” 111
D. The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations:
The ROC Strikes Back
The ROC’s continual effort to restrict the activities of “nontraditional” religious groups ultimately led the legislature to amend
the Law on Freedom of Conscience in 1997. These amendments—
widely analyzed and criticized at the time 112—sought to place heavy
limits on religious groups new to Russia and had the effect of giving
the Orthodox Church as well as other “traditional” religions a
privileged status in Russia. At their core, the amendments confirmed
the growing and diversified political influence of the ROC, 113

109. Id. art. 80.
110. Daniel & Marsh, supra note 38, at 7. Indeed, from the ROC’s perspective, what was
four more years after waiting seventy to reassert what it considered a rightful historic
entitlement?
111. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 31, at 155.
112. See, e.g., Kovatch, supra note 30; Bourdeaux, supra note 26; Juviler, supra note 44.
113. Nationalist Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky was quoted as saying, “[I]f the
Patriarch tells us to vote for some version of the bill—we’ll oblige, and if he tells us not to
vote—we won’t!” Lekhel, supra note 20, at 189 n.127 (quoting Ivan Rodin et al., Prinyat
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constrained the legal protections extended to freedom of
conscience, 114 and established a de facto hierarchy of religions with
the ROC poised at its apex. 115 Most observers have concluded that
passage of the 1997 law served as reward for the “high level of
(diffuse) support” provided by the ROC to the Yeltsin regime. 116
Bourdeaux labeled the 1997 law a “blueprint for the return of state
control over religion, albeit of a different kind from that formerly
exercised by the Communist Party,” 117 and he presciently identified
it as “only one aspect of the gathering spirit of resentment against
the West in Russia.” 118
Although Yeltsin expressed his view that the 1997 amendments
contradicted the basic foundation of Russia’s constitutional
structure, provisions of the Constitution, and general principles and
norms of international law, 119 he nevertheless assented to the draft
bill. This fateful decision may have been foremost in Aleksey’s mind
when he recently described Yeltsin’s tenure as heralding “a totally
new epoch in relations between the Church and [S]tate . . . an epoch
of respectful relations.” 120
In fact, much of what the amended law promulgated was already
enforced in the areas of Serpukhov, Arkhangel’sk, and Astrakhan. 121
Russia’s failure to implement its constitutional guarantees related to

Novyj Variant Zakona o Svobode Sovesti [A New Version of the Law on the Freedom of Conscience
is Adopted], NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Sept. 20, 1997). According to McGann, Aleksey
extended “tacit support” to right-wing nationalists “as a ploy to gain political bargaining
leverage.” McGann, supra note 26, at 14–15.
114. Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 1997, No. 39, Item 4465 (Russian Federation Federal Law No.
125-FZ, “On freedom of conscience and religious associations”) [hereinafter 1997 Law].
115. Juviler, supra note 44, at 229.
116. Hesli, supra note 90, at 47.
117. Bourdeaux, supra note 55, at 141.
118. Id. at 145.
119. Daniel & Marsh, supra note 38, at 7 (quoting Letter from Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin,
President of the Russian Federation, to G.N. Seleznev, President of the State Duma, and E.S.
Stroev, President of the Federation Council (July 23, 1997), in Report of the Press Service of
the President of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin Threatens Not to Enforce Law if Veto
Overriden, #1997-07-23-006, available at http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/
9707.html).
120. Yeltsin Opened New Epoch in Relations Between Church and State - Alexy II,
INTERFAX, Apr. 23, 2008, available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST, 2008-#80, Apr. 24 2008.
121. Daniel & Marsh, supra note 38, at 11. The authors observe that: “Local and
regional courts had few qualms about violating [the 1990 religion law when it was] seen as
causing harm to Russia’s cultural environment.” Id. at 6.
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religious freedom even prior to 1997 also caused the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the largest
regional security organization in the world, to take note. A
November 1996 OSCE Review Meeting pointed to “systematic and
gross violations of [Russia’s] basic constitutional principles on the
part of both federal and local governmental structures, as well as
religious organizations,” particularly with regard to “principles of
nonestablishment and the separation between church and state.” 122
While some observers have remarked that the arrangement set
forth in the 1997 law mirrors that found in a number of democratic
states and therefore “does not appear to contradict international
practice,” 123 one need only look to Russian domestic law—in this
case, the Constitution itself—to find the contradiction. Lawrence
Uzzell, who even argues “that the Western missionaries themselves
have a lot to answer for, for their insensitivity in going into a place
that has had thousands of years of Christianity,” still concludes that
“freedom of conscience is the most fundamental of all human rights
[and by] violating its own [C]onstitution in this way, Russia is
raising grave doubts about even its desire to become a law-governed
state.” 124
While Russia’s Constitutional Court has handed down a number
of rulings that limit the effect of some of the 1997 law’s more
restrictive provisions, its deleterious effect continues to be felt. The
implications of the 1997 amendments go deep into the psyche and
consciousness of the nation, far beyond the implications of any
ordinary legislation. Consider for example that the preamble of the
1997 law recognizes “a special role of the Orthodox Church in the
history of Russia [and] the formation and development of its
spirituality and culture . . . .” Thereafter the preamble acknowledges
“respect for the Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other
religions constituting an integral part of the historical heritage of the
peoples of Russia.” 125 Consider also that Article 4(1) of the law
reaffirms that “The Russian Federation is a secular state.” 126 Now
reconcile this legal landscape with President Putin’s response after

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Shterin & Richardson, supra note 31, at 146.
Lekhel, supra note 20, at 203.
Hearst, supra note 71, at 8
1997 Law, supra note 114, preamble (emphasis added).
Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
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being asked whether Russian law prohibits bestowing privileges on
the ROC and calls for a secular state: “This is not the case. [Russia is
not a secular state.] The law states that Russia has four traditional
religions.” 127
Plainly, only the preamble to the 1997 law mentions traditional
religions, whereas the actual operative section (Article 4(1))
reaffirms the Constitution’s Article 14 designation of Russia as a
secular state. Ironically, even ROC spokesman Rev. Chaplin has
affirmed that the “preamble . . . is not legally binding, and should
rather be viewed as only a ‘lyrical digression.’” 128
Clearly, in Russia today, “it’s not Law that prevails but
ideological priorities of the state policy. And the Constitutional
Court isn’t going to oppose this policy.” 129 In other words, it almost
doesn’t matter what the Constitutional Court does or what the
Constitution says; all that matters is what the leaders believe and
disseminate as fact. Indeed, in much the same way that the Putin
regime moved quickly to silence its critics, 130 so too is the ROC swift
to silence those within the institution who presume to criticize the
government—as well as those outside targeting the ROC itself for
criticism. Father Sergei Taratukhin, a Russian Orthodox priest, was
defrocked for “political activity and slandering the [C]hurch
leadership” 131 after declaring jailed Yukos CEO Mikhail
Khodorkovsky a “victim of political games.” 132 Shortly thereafter,
Father Sergei decided to refute his support of Khodorkovsky. By

127. Interview by Time Magazine with Vladimir Putin, former President of the Russian
Federation, near Moscow, Russia (Dec. 12, 2007). A partial video of the interview is available
at http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_
1691763_1691291,00.html (emphasis added).
128. Vsevolod Chaplin, Faith, Freedom and Law, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997.
129. Galina Krylova, The Problems of Religious Freedom in the Decisions of the Russian
Constitutional Court, Paper Presented at Center for Studies of New Religions (CESNUR)
Conference, Riga, Latvia (Aug. 29–31, 2000), http://www.cesnur.org/conferences/
riga2000/krylova.htm.
130. Consider any number of examples: the fate of Russian investigative journalist Anna
Politkovskaya, one of Putin’s most vocal critics concerning the ongoing war in Chechnya,
assassinated in October 2006 by a still as yet unapprehended assailant; the criminal and civil
charges against Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky based on fraud, tax evasion, and
other allegations, but likely motivated by contributions to opposition political parties; or the
ongoing campaign against NGOs critical of government policy. Blitt, supra note 7.
131. Higgins, supra note 23, at A18.
132. Id.; see Alexander Osipovich, Piety’s Comeback as a Kremlin Virtue, THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008.
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“falling to his knees in front of television cameras,” he won a partial
reprieve and was granted employment as a trash collector at a
cathedral in the city of Chita. 133 Bourdeaux has gone so far as to
claim that “[i]n recent times no bishop has criticized any aspect of
Kremlin policy,” 134 and that the situation resembles “a scene
reminiscent of clergy who recanted their anti-Soviet activities in
former days.” 135
In spite of Russia’s Constitution, the 1997 amendments signaled
a formal, “legislated” return to the ROC’s “traditional” vision of
Russian society, whereby the Church and State maintained “a
symphonic relationship [working] together harmoniously to manage
worldly affairs and prepare inhabitants for entrance into the world to
come.” 136 It ostensibly tamed the “onslaught of destructive religious
pluralism” 137 and also entrenched—by way of the “traditional” and
“non-traditional” labels—a key distinction that the ROC would
invoke repeatedly to differentiate itself from other religious
groups. 138 This watershed event also served to make any number of
subsequent developments seem almost insignificant in comparison.
However, when contemplated in toto these developments confirm
the utter breakdown of separation of church and state, the
devaluation of constitutional currency (to a hypocritical point
arguably reaching Soviet levels), and the stifling of religious freedom
in Russia.

133. Adrian Blomfield, Orthodox Church Unholy Alliance with Putin, THE TELEGRAPH,
Feb. 26, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/
2008/02/23/wrussia123.xml. Taratukhin’s job reportedly also includes “supervising . . .
snow removal and other menial tasks.” Higgins, supra note 23, at A18.
134. Bourdeaux, supra note 19.
135. Id.
136. Daniel & Marsh, supra note 38, at 11.
137. Lekhel, supra note 20, at 197.
138. According to the USCIRF, “Many of the problems faced by minority religious
communities in Russia stem from the notion set forth in the preface to [the 1997 Law] that
only four religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—have ‘traditional’
status in that country.” USCIRF, POLICY FOCUS: RUSSIA (2006), http://uscirf.gov/
countries/publications/policyfocus/Russia.pdf.
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IV. CHURCH-STATE SYMBIOSIS ON STEROIDS, 1998–2008: SO
MANY RED FLAGS IN SO LITTLE TIME
A. Overview
The 1997 amendments discussed above paved the way for a
series of subsequent developments that further undermined Russia’s
constitutional separation of church and state. Yet, in a recent article,
Daniel and Marsh tacitly criticize “some analysts and journalists
[who] have already rendered judgment[]” on the “major
institutional forms . . . and the role of the Orthodoxy” in Russia. 139
The authors reason that these “major institutional forms are not yet
determined, and the role of the Orthodoxy, as well as other religions
within Russia’s civil and political order await definition.” 140 It is
difficult to avoid taking issue with this sweeping assertion, given that
Russia has already determined—now going on fifteen years—what its
“major institutional forms” and “civil and political order” entail: a
Constitution that provides for human rights guarantees, separation
of church and state, a secular government, and respect for
international and regional human rights norms. Nowhere in these
arrangements is any room afforded for religious interference within
government (or vice versa), discrimination among religious groups,
or other unjustifiable differential treatment.
Moreover, if the 1997 law truly reflects “a larger battle within
Russia to redefine itself,” 141 it still stands to reason that until a clear
signal is sent by the legislature or president to that effect, it behooves
the government—as well as the courts—to respect the rule of law
and Russia’s constitutional and international law obligations as they
currently stand. As long as Russia’s leaders continue to profess that
the country remains secular or “multiconfessional,” 142 but then offer
up ambiguous statements like: “Of course, we have a separation of
[s]tate and [c]hurch . . . . But in the people’s soul they’re
together,” 143 or prominently take part in Orthodox festivals, 144 they

139. Daniel & Marsh, supra note 38, at 15.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Osipovich, supra note 132.
143. Yuri Zarakhovich, Putin’s Reunited Russian Church, TIME, May 17, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1622544,00.html.
144. Weir, supra note 81, at 6.
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should be held to account for possible violations of Russia’s
constitutional law as well as its regional and international obligations.
Anything less than this accounting practically serves as an
endorsement of the unfurling collusion between the ROC and the
State to gradually, but still illegitimately, insinuate themselves into
one another and rewrite the rules free from any consequences as if
the outcome was in some way the result of a wholly justifiable,
natural, or expected progression.
The following section examines the extent to which both the
State and the ROC have overstepped defined constitutional
boundaries since 1997. In the process, they have devalued Russia’s
constitutional text and jeopardized the country’s compliance with
obligations emanating from such key human rights treaties as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the European Convention. Of course, this pattern of flaunting the
Constitution will be familiar to any observer of developments in
Russia, particularly as applied to civil rights during Putin’s tenure. 145
Perhaps as a sign of things to come, following Yeltsin’s abrupt
resignation, Vladimir Putin specifically called upon Aleksey to bless
the “transfer of a briefcase containing secret nuclear codes.” 146 The
patriarch’s blessing at this crucial “transfer of power” moment made
Putin the “first Russian leader to [publicly] profess his faith in God
since 1917.” 147 Indeed, during his presidency, Putin did much to
further blur the divide between church and state and deepen the
relationship between the ROC and the Kremlin. According to
Reverend Chaplin, the 1990s phenomenon of podsvechnik (slang for
politicians who pandered to the Church but lacked a deep
understanding of Orthodox faith) ended under Putin’s rule: “This
doesn’t exist anymore . . . . Among politicians, there are now more
and more people who read the Gospels[,] . . . go on pilgrimages and
attend [C]hurch services.” 148
Although scholars debate the need to link current government
practice back to historical and traditional models of church-state
relations, the more pressing concern is whether ongoing
developments in this area violate existing constitutional norms.

145.
146.
147.
148.

See Blitt, supra note 7, Part I.
LaFraniere, supra note 24, at A1.
Osipovich, supra note 132.
Id.
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Gvosdev argues that “[i]t would be nigh impossible to separate what
is ‘religious’ from what is not,” because “Orthodoxy has shaped and
molded many areas of Russian cultural, spiritual, and political life.” 149
To bolster his claim, Gvosdev asks:
[A]re Rachmaninoff’s liturgical compositions, for example,
religious or cultural? Would performance of that Orthodox
liturgical music by state-sponsored cultural organs constitute a
violation of religious freedom or compromise the “secular” nature
of the government? . . . The government cannot constitutionally
mandate that Orthodoxy be stripped from Russian culture . . . this
is an issue which ultimately lies outside the scope of constitutional
law. 150

As a rule, these would all be good questions that the Russian
Constitutional Court could answer and that the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), at least to the extent that they raise
questions related to Russia’s regional human rights treaty
obligations, could further clarify. However, given the real
circumstances as they exist today, these are the wrong questions to
ask. More appropriately, the following section focuses not on the
contrived, hypothetical, easy questions, but rather, on the real,
constantly unfolding questions that are responsible for diminishing
respect for Russia’s constitutional text and its international
commitments: In Russia today, is it constitutionally acceptable for
government agencies to request patron saints from the ROC or build
new Orthodox churches on government land? Is it acceptable to
have religion or morality courses in public schools that promote one
religious ideal above others and say nothing of the religious beliefs
that do not rise to the level of “traditional”? Is it permissible to
discriminate against a religious group because it is considered “nontraditional”? These questions are far more urgent, concrete, and
indicative of the struggle confronting Russia today. These are the
questions that need to be answered, no matter how intriguing a
theoretical debate about the nature of Rachmaninoff’s oeuvre may
be.

149. Gvosdev, supra note 103, at 533.
150. Id.
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B. Infiltration of Religion into Government

Although Russia’s constitution provides for separation of church
and state, religious practices infiltrated Putin’s government in an
unprecedented manner. According to both critics and supporters of
the ROC, under Putin, “government officials [became] more
pious—at least outwardly—and . . . deepened their contacts with the
[C]hurch hierarchy.” 151 This development defies the Constitution’s
separation of church and state and its guarantees of equality and
nondiscrimination between religious groups. Moreover, like Putin’s
swearing-in ceremony, these examples also contradict the same 1997
Law on Freedom of Conscience supported by the ROC. Article 4(4)
of that law provides that:
The activity of agencies of state power and . . . local administration
[shall] not [be] accompanied by public religious rites and
ceremonies. Officials of state power, or of other state agencies, or
of agencies of local administration, as well as military figures, [shall]
not have the right to use their official status for advancing one or
another religious affiliation. 152

When the United States government called attention to the
apparent overlap between church and state in Russia, the ROC was
quick to clarify in the form of a missive from Metropolitan Kirill 153 to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:
The fact that His Holiness Patriarch [Aleksey] II has a seat of
honour when the President of the Russian Federation addresses the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation does not entail any
concrete consequences for a church-state relationship. I would like
to note that various customs are the background of protocol order
in different countries. It is a long-standing tradition to give
prominence to people who enjoy considerable authority and

151. Osipovich, supra note 132.
152. 1997 Law, supra note 114, art. 4(4).
153. KGB archive materials indicate that Kirill also served as a KGB agent under the
codename “Mikhailov.” As Dunlop notes, “[I]t should be stressed that an ‘agent’ of the
former KGB was considerably more than an informer; he or she was an active operative of the
Committee for State Security, in effect a nonuniformed officer of that organization.” Dunlop,
supra note 38, at 30. For additional discussion regarding KGB infiltration of the ROC, see
supra Part II.
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respect of their fellow citizens. They could be state heroes, persons
involved in the arts and science, sportsmen, or religious leaders. 154

Kirill’s response to the State Department’s International
Religious Freedom Report is nothing more than an effort at sleight
of hand, and a poor one at that. Rather than address the implications
of granting a seat of honor to the leader of a single religion in a
multi-confessional and officially secular country, he likens Aleksey to
a sportsman. For better or worse, Russia’s Constitution is silent with
regard to separation of sport from state; it is not, however, silent on
the topic of religion. Surely, any “concrete consequences” for
Russia’s Constitution ought to be determined by a court rather than
by a Church functionary.
In any case, there is no shortage of illustrations underscoring the
troubling implications of deepening church-state contacts in Russia.
For example, Igor S. Ivanov, Russia’s foreign minister between 1998
and 2004, and secretary of the National Security Council until July
2007, allegedly required that all of his staff members be baptized
before they could work for him. 155 Along a similar line, the Moscow
City Court and the Prosecutor General’s Office now maintain
Orthodox chapels on their premises. 156 The Church of St. Sofia of
God’s Wisdom, “a small structure off Lubyanskaya Ploshchad . . .
happens to be the official church” of the Federal Security Service
(FSB), the KGB’s successor agency. 157
In addition to building official churches, government agencies
often adopt their own special prayers. The FSB, for example, now
beseeches “Saint Alexander Nevsky [to] help the agency defeat ‘all
visible and invisible enemies . . . .’” 158 Not to be outdone, members
of the Defense Ministry have attended special ROC services in the
Cathedral of Christ the Savior. A formal blessing for the “rank-and154. Metropolitan Kirill, An Open Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in
80 EUROPAICA BULLETIN, Dec. 6, 2005, http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/80.aspx#5.
155. Christopher Marsh, BYU Conference on International Religious Freedom, Panel on
Russia, (Oct. 2008); see also Christopher Marsh, Orthodox Spiritual Capital and Russian
Reform, in SPIRITUAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES (Gordon Redding ed.)
(forthcoming) (on file with author).
156. Zarakhovich, supra note 143. The Moscow City Court was custom-built in 2004.
Alexander Osipovich, Bumpy Ride in Drive To Reshape Society, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 12,
2008.
157. Osipovich, supra note 132.
158. Peter Finn, Saints in Demand in Russia as Church Asserts Tie to State, WASH. POST,
Apr. 20, 2007, at A24.
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file” of the 12th Main Directorate, the agency responsible for
overseeing Russia’s consolidated nuclear arsenal (Navy, Air Force,
and rocket-based), 159 followed the services. In addition, the ROC
officially designated the Orthodox saint, St. Seraphim of Sarov, as
“the spiritual patron-protector” of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and
bestowed an “Orthodox Church flag with the icon of St. Seraphim”
on the 12th Directorate. 160 This was not the first time that the
Church had bestowed blessings on Russia’s military. Patriarch
Aleksey II blessed the Russian army prior to its advance on
Chechnya. 161 The ROC also has been invited to bless “submarines,
armaments, and boundary posts,” among other sundry items. 162
When asked during an interview whether he thought it was
inappropriate for the Church to bless “all kinds of weapons,”
Metropolitan Kirill replied, “Priests do that when they are asked,” 163
as if a request from the government made it all constitutionally valid,
or at least cleared the ROC of any complicity in undermining
constitutional secularism in Russia. 164
Indeed, ROC connections with the military go deeper and are
more pervasive than formal ceremonies alone. Although Russia lacks
a law permitting military chaplains, according to the ROC, more
than 2000 Orthodox priests minister to soldiers on a voluntary,
unofficial basis. The Patriarchate even maintains a military liaison
department. “Putin has endorsed the practice, while saying that
freedom of religion should be protected.” 165 Yet, what has unfolded
is a situation in which other religious groups are shut off from
accessing the military, and “[o]nly the Orthodox clergy are entitled
to give ecclesiastic guidance.” 166 In other words, the ROC preserves
159. Transcript: General Habiger Press Briefing on Trip to Russia, USIS WASH. FILE,
June 24, 1998, http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1998/98062407_wpo.html.
160. Pavel Felgenhauer, General Declares Russian Nukes Secure, JAMESTOWN FOUND.
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, Sept. 20, 2007; see also Viktor Yuzbashev & Pavel Krug, Armed
Forces: A Prayer to Nuclear Weapons: Anniversary of the Most Secret RF Defense Ministry
Directorate, NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Sept. 19, 2007.
161. Bourdeaux is more blunt: “Patriarch [Aleksey] II has on several occasions blessed
the Russian Army, most notably when it was about to descend on Chechnya, to destroy
Grozny, the capital, and beat the local people into submission.” Bourdeaux, supra note 19.
162. Gaskova, supra note 36, at 119.
163. Spiegel Online International, supra note 52.
164. Metropolitan Kirill’s reaction also hints at the ROC’s compliancy and utter inability
to meaningfully criticize government policy.
165. Osipovich, supra note 132.
166. Zarakhovich, supra note 143.
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a protected monopoly in this area despite the unavoidable reality that
members of other religious groups also serve in Russia’s military. 167
What makes this special treatment even more remarkable is the fact
that members of these other religious groups include Muslim
citizens, who by 2015 are predicted to “make up a majority of
Russia’s conscript army, and by 2020 a fifth of the population.” 168
The Defense Ministry is not the only state body or agency that
has coveted a patron saint, and the ROC has willingly responded to
the demand. The FSB and Rus (a police special forces unit operating
in Chechnya) have bickered over which group will get saint
Alexander Nevsky, a legendary thirteenth-century military
commander. In addition, “the Strategic Rocket Forces, which
oversee Russia’s land-based nuclear missiles, have Saint Barbara, the
tax police have Saint Anthony, the Border Guards have Saint Ilya
Muromets and the Ministry of Interior’s troops have Saint Vladimir,
among dozens of other examples.” 169
Moreover, several years ago the Church successfully lobbied to
create a new national holiday, People’s Unity Day. This new holiday,
celebrated on November 4, replaced the former Communist holiday
commemorating the anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution
that was celebrated on November 7. Before 1917, November 4 was
a Church holiday honoring the Kazan Mother of God icon, a symbol
of the end to the “Time of Troubles” and Polish occupation of
Moscow. “The initiated, however, also know that [November 4] has
another significance: on almost the same day [in] 1721, the Senate

167. See Osipovich, supra note 132 (acknowledging that military chaplains can be legally
recognized in countries with separation of church and state).
168. Michael Mainville, Russia Has a Muslim Dilemma Ethnic Russians Hostile to
Muslims, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2006, at A17, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/19/MNGJGMFUVG1.DTL; see also Rozan Yunos and
Bandar Seri Begawan, Russia 20% Muslim by 2020, THE BRUNEI TIMES, July 27, 2007,
available at http://www.bt.com.bn/en/features/2007/07/27/russia_20_muslim_by_2020.
Others claim these estimates are too high. According to Roman Silantyev, a “Russian
islamologist,” [sic] “The most widespread estimation of [twenty] million Muslims is unrealistic
. . . the most serious myth.” Roman Silantyev, 20 Million Muslims in Russia and Mass
Conversion of Ethnic Russians are Myths—Expert, INTERFAX, Apr. 10, 2007,
http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=2869. Nevertheless, Russia is confronting
a population decline of “at least 700,000 people each year, leading to slow depopulation of the
northern and eastern extremes of Russia,” primarily composed of white ethnic Russians. Steven
Eke, Russia Faces Demographic Disaster, BBC NEWS, June 7, 2006, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5056672.stm.
169. Finn, supra note 158, at A24.
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proclaimed Peter the Great an emperor and transformed the country
into the Russian Empire.” 170
To be certain, adoption of Orthodox symbols and prayers by
public entities—as well as religiously-inspired holidays and ROC
presence at official state events—blatantly promotes the interest of
one religious community at the expense of official secularism. But it
also serves to alienate other religious groups as well as all those who
seek to give real meaning to Russia’s constitutional tenets. While
some of these developments may strike the reader as charming or
even harmless, each incident in fact creates another crack, another
tear, another fissure in the deteriorating wall separating church and
state in Russia, particularly when viewed in totality alongside the list
of parallel incidents discussed below pertaining to government
policy.
C. Common Policy Visions
The fact that Putin’s regime and the ROC shared virtually
uniform policy views and objectives on a host of issues both explains
and buttresses the cozy relationship between church and state. ROC
leaders “seem perfectly willing to lend their support to the Kremlin.
They . . . consistently backed Putin as he . . . retreated from Western
liberal values, cracked down on critics and built up the power of the
[S]tate.” 171 According to Reverend Chaplin, “Putin regularly
consults [Aleksey] on domestic issues and . . . [C]hurch leaders talk
almost daily with Putin’s aides.” 172
1. On human rights
Russia’s mounting rejection of international human rights
standards can be traced back to a number of mutually reinforcing
sources. As Schlafly has observed, “While veneration of nationalreligious defense against a foreign invader can be found in other
170. Victor Yasmann, The Soft-Power Foundations of Putin’s Russia, RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO LIBRARY, Nov. 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/11/1C18A48DDC41-41B4-88E3-E94459ECC104.html.
171. Osipovich, supra note 132. Even editorial cartoonists are not immune from the
crackdown on regime critics. See Shaun Walker, No Laughing Matter: Cartoons and the
Kremlin, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/europe/nolaughing-matter-cartoons-and-the-kremlin-818063.html. This reality also plays into Putin’s
general control over the media, discussed infra.
172. LaFraniere, supra note 24, at A1.
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countries . . . the consistency and intensity of Russian perceptions of
a Latin Western threat, at once religious, cultural, and military, has
no parallel.” 173 Given that the Western threat is perceived as
operating across a variety of levels, it is not surprising to find that
Putin’s government and the ROC consistently articulated a shared
vision that is insular, relativist, confrontational, and contrary to the
standards set forth in international and regional obligations and
undertakings. Metropolitan Kirill has insisted that international and
domestic law in the field of human rights must be developed with
due consideration of religion’s role in society: “Otherwise, alienation
and opposition of the major part of humanity to current global
processes will only grow.” 174 As part of a recent global “offensive”
on human rights, Kirill urged members of the UN Human Rights
Council to support the establishment of a consultative religious
council at the UN for the purpose of policing human rights norms
development, particularly as they might interfere with cultural
tradition and morality. 175 In Kirill’s view, this interference is already
afoot:
[T]he human rights concept is used to cover up lies, falsehood and
insults against religious and national values. Moreover, the
catalogue of human rights and freedoms is gradually being
augmented by ideas which conflict not only with Christian but also
with the traditional moral understanding of the person. This is
alarming since behind human rights stands the compulsory force of
the [S]tate, which can compel people to commit sin, sympathize
with or allow sin to occur through banal conformity. 176

Kirill continues to argue that this interference is driven by
Western norms:

173. Schlafly, supra note 8, at 139.
174. Bishop’s Council of the Russian Church to Adopt a Document on Human Rights,
INTERFAX, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4421.
175. See, e.g., Metropolitan Kirill, Address to the 7th session of the UN Human Rights
Council during the panel on “Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights” (Mar. 18, 2008)
(audio file available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080318).
176. Metropolitan Kirill, Human Rights and Moral Responsibility, Part I, in 97
EUROPAICA BULLETIN, May 23, 2006, http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/97.aspx#3.
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There is an opinion that human rights are a universal norm. 177
According to this view, there can be no Orthodox, Islamic,
Buddhist, Russian or American concept of human rights since this
would introduce relativity into the understanding of human rights,
thus considerably restricting their functioning in international life .
. . . The point is that this concept was generated and developed in
Western countries, with their unique historical and cultural
destiny. 178

Aleksey II has advocated a similar viewpoint in a recent address
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE):
[T]oday there occurs a break between human rights and morality,
and this break threatens the European civilization. We can see it in
a new generation of rights that contradict morality, and in how
human rights are used to justify immoral behavior . . . . If we
ignore moral norms, we ultimately ignore freedom too . . . [I]n
[the] public sphere, both state and society should encourage and
support moral principles acceptable for the majority of citizens.
Therefore they should use mass media, social institutions, and
education system to pursue the moral ideals that are linked with
spiritual and cultural tradition of the European nations. 179

This type of talk is in fact thinly veined rhetoric aimed at
justifying special status for the ROC in Russian society and
downgrading “universal” human rights—particularly individual
rights—to a level deemed acceptable to the Church and consistent
with its vision for Russia. Not surprisingly it matches up seamlessly
with the approach taken by the Russian government. Objecting to
the release of a United States human rights report, Russia’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs asserted: “[W]e are convinced in the

177. It is impossible to ignore the fact that in this one sentence, Metropolitan Kirill
reduces instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—together with
everything it has come to embody over sixty years—to a mere “opinion.”
178. Kirill, supra note 176. To be sure, this perspective has resulted in some stilted
positions on the part of the Church. Consider the ROC’s recent criticism over the West’s
“undue” attention to the human rights situation in Tibet. According to Reverend Chaplin,
Western media is manipulating the situation in Tibet to advance the political interests of the
West, since there are many other conflicts in the world that “claim many more casualties and
victims than the number of people killed recently in Tibet” but don’t get the same attention.
Moscow Patriarchate Slams Coverage of Tibet Unrest in Western Media, INTERFAX, Mar. 27,
2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4457.
179. Patriarch Aleksy II, The Address of Patriarch Aleksy II of Moscow and All Russia to
the PACE (Oct. 3, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.pravmir.com/article_246.html).
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inadmissibility of the use of the ideas of democracy and human rights
as a cover for interference in internal affairs.” 180 This stance comes
directly from Putin, who previously has remarked that “when
speaking of common values, we should . . . respect the historical
diversity of European civilization. It would be useless and wrong to
try to force artificial ‘standards’ on each other.” 181
These statements—couched in terms of historical and cultural
difference—together with the ROC’s endorsement of them are
contrary not only to the object and purpose of the ECHR (and
Russia’s other international obligations), but also flout Russia’s
express commitment that domestic human rights can no longer be
made subject to a rule of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a
country. As part of the OSCE’s human dimension policy,
participating states (including Russia) have agreed, inter alia, that:
[I]ssues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms,
democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as
respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the
foundations of the international order. They categorically and
irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of
the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct and
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong
exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. 182

While this undertaking may not rise to the level of a legally
binding norm, it remains politically binding on the state party. In the
OSCE’s words, the “distinction is between legal and political and
not between binding and non-binding . . . OSCE commitments are
more than a simple declaration of will or good intention; they are a
political promise to comply with these standards.” 183
The vision of shirking from or attempting to redefine basic
international human rights norms shared by the ROC and Russian
180. Blitt, supra note 7.
181. Id.
182. Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
OSCE, preamble (Oct. 3, 1991) (emphasis added). The USSR was admitted to the OSCE on
June 25, 1973. Russia signed the Charter of Paris on Nov. 21, 1990. See OSCE, About
Participating States, http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html#R. Background on the origin
of this provision is provided in Jean-Rodrigue Paré, The OSCE in 2006, PARLIAMENTARY
INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE OF CANADA (PIRS), Revised Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0522-e.htm.
183. OSCE, Politically Binding Commitments, http://www.osce.org/odihr/13493
.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2008).
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government is not limited to the purpose of minimizing scrutiny of
Russia’s internal affairs. With respect to external developments, the
ROC is also quick to support the Russian government and reiterate
its view that human rights is a harmful Western concept used as a
tool to trample on otherwise valid cultural and historical traditions.
Consider Metropolitan Kirill’s remarks in the wake of Kosovo’s
declaration of independence:
Certain countries often use human rights as a tool to promote their
national interests . . . . [Such situations] foment tensions in the
world and sow prejudices regarding human rights . . . . Certain
countries are behaving absolutely undemocratically in considering
their human rights enforcement systems universal. Using direct or
indirect methods, they are trying to impose their standards on
other peoples or become the only judges in the human rights
area. 184

2. On non-governmental organizations
Kirill’s reference to outsiders using “direct or indirect methods”
as a means of “imposing” standards links directly to Russia’s policy
on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Putin’s 2004 State of
Union accused some NGOs of “obtaining funding from influential
foreign or domestic foundations” or of “servicing dubious group and
commercial interests.” 185 Not to be outdone, Kirill described these
NGOs as “people who are professionally fighting the [ROC]; who
don’t love Russia, to put it mildly,” 186 and suggested that Russia
“reserves the right to deviate from international human rights norms
to correct the ‘harmful emphasis’ on ‘heightened individualism’
which has infiltrated Russian society under the cover” of NGOs. 187
Given the shared concern over the harmful impact “[W]esterndriven” NGO activities may have on the fragile fabric of Russian
society, it is not difficult to imagine the ROC’s eager endorsement of
the 2006 amendments to Russia’s law governing these
184. Russian Church Criticizes Kosovo’s Recognition as Independent State, INTERFAX,
Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4418.
185. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Putin’s Definition Of Democracy?, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004,
at A23.
186. Osipovich, supra note 132.
187. USCIRF, Challenge to Civil Society: Russia’s Amended Law on Noncommercial
Organizations, 6–7 (Mar. 22, 2007) http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/russia_
ngo_report_final_march5_ru-formatted%20for%20web.pdf.
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organizations. 188 What must have been disconcerting, however, was
the heavy-handedness of the government’s “spray and pray”
approach to regulation, whereby it drafted an overbroad law in the
hope of having it cover all possible eventualities. In a letter to the
Federal Registration Service—the agency tasked with enforcing the
amended NGO law189—Russian Orthodox Archbishop Nikon
(Vasyukov) of Ufa and Sterlitamak summed up the ROC’s mixed
feelings regarding its hearty endorsement of the government effort
to regulate NGOs on the one hand, and its utter confusion on the
other:
We understand the [S]tate’s close interest in the activity of all types
of social and so-called “human rights” organisations which . . . are
actively financed by foreign secret services and openly conduct
provocative and anti-Russian activity, but it is completely
incomprehensible why this interest has been transferred to the
activity of traditional religious organisations like the [ROC] . . . In
our opinion the accounting [requirements] stipulated [in the
amended law amount] to state interference in the activity of
religious organisations unprecedented since Soviet times. 190

Not insignificantly, the amended NGO law compelled all
religious organizations to report on “how many parishioners attend
every service, how much parishioners give to their religious
organizations, and what is discussed at meetings of senior religious
officials.” 191 According to Ksenia Chernega, an attorney for the
ROC, the Church would “experience great difficulties” with the new

188. Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 18FZ (on Introducing Amendments to Certain
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation), amending Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1996, No. 7-FZ (on
Nonprofit Organizations), available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?
tid=2&lid=644&less=false. See also a series of similar amendments for Sobranie
Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation]
1995, No. 82-FZ on Public Associations, available at http://www.legislationline.org/
legislation.php?tid=2&lid=640&less=false. For a detailed discussion, see Blitt, supra note 7.
189. Known in Russian as Rosregistratsiya.
190. Geraldine Fagan, Religious Organisations NGO Law Financial Accounting
Simplified, FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 2007, available at http://www.forum18.org/
Archive.php?article_id=943. It is worth calling attention here to Archbishop Nikon’s use of the
term “traditional” religious organizations as those being entitled to a waiver of reporting
obligations. Clearly, the ROC would be happy to leave “nontraditional” religious groups
saddled with the task of full reporting and Soviet-style state interference.
191. Religious Groups Get a Waiver, MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007.
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reporting system and could not “be put on the same footing as other
NGOs.” 192
Predictably, the ROC—along with virtually every other religious
organization in Russia—vigorously lobbied the government in
protest. In response, the government formed a commission chaired
by then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to discuss an
exemption for religious organizations from the NGO law’s reporting
requirements. A subsequent decree issued on April 10, 2007
promulgated new regulations for religious organizations that waived
the most onerous accounting requirements. 193
At first glance, it appears that the government and the ROC did
not see eye to eye on the precise scope of the campaign against
NGOs in Russia. Clearly, the ROC had no inclination that
regulation of NGOs—“provocative” and “anti-Russian” enemies of
the state and church—would implicate its own institutional
autonomy. One could speculate as to how the decision to scrutinize
religious organizations under the amended NGO law came about.
For example, was it part of a conscious government effort to seek
access to the ROC’s—and other religious organizations’—financial
and parishioner data? Or was it simply the result of an innocent if
overzealous bureaucratic oversight? Regardless of the outcome of
this inquiry, an understanding of the ROC’s rising influence in
Russia, and particularly its thickening ties to the government, make it

192. Government to Try Out New Methods of Church Control, KOMMERSANT, Dec. 8,
2006, reprinted in Russia: Religious Organizations Appeal New Accountability, HUMAN
RIGHTS WITHOUT FRONTIERS PRESS SERVICE (Willy Fautré ed., 2006). To be certain, the
ROC wasn’t the only religious organization concerned with the new reporting requirements.
Rabbi Zinovy Kogan, chairman of the Congress of Jewish Religious Communities and
Organizations in Russia, observed that “[c]ertainly the new accounting rules [were
undoubtedly] an encroachment,” and Ravil Gainutdin, chairman of the Board of Muftis of
Russia, commented that “such [controlling measures were] monitoring [and was] unacceptable
in democratic conditions . . . . The [S]tate has only one responsibility—that of registering a
religious organization, not of counting up its worshippers and the money collected . . . . The
[S]tate’s business is to register a religious organization, not to count how many people come
or how much money they give.” Id. (modified quotes are available in the original press report
at
http://www.kommersant.com/p728559/r_1/noncommercial_organizations_religious_
freedom/).
193. Id. According to the new reporting form, instead of specifying types of activities,
objectives, and number of participants, religious organizations only have to indicate whether
they have “conducted religious rites, preaching, education, literature distribution, pilgrimage,
charitable work and/or ‘other’ activities.” Id. Religious organizations must still “account for
donations made by outside organizations as well as for ‘use of other property’.” Id.; see also
Fagan, supra note 190.

749

BLITT. FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/2/2008 7:10 PM

[2008

impossible to interpret the government’s move to later amend the
law as anything but an overt appeasement and a means of securing
continued ROC support of the Putin government and its policies.
One could also reason that the government’s decision to extend the
waiver to all religious groups, rather than only the ROC or the
“traditional” religions, is evidence of an even-handed approach to
religious organizations. This might be the case, but for the
undeniably massive scrutiny imposed on Russia by the international
community in the lead up to the NGO law’s implementation.
Along a similar line of reasoning, one might point to the waiver
campaign waged by various religious organizations and suggest that
the ROC is willing and prepared to work side by side with other
religious organizations to safeguard its own precious religious
freedom. This perception would be gravely mistaken for a number of
reasons. First, the ROC would not entertain the idea of operating on
the same plane as “non-traditional” religious organizations (let alone
unrecognized religious groups). Second, while the ROC may engage
the “traditional” religious faiths (Christianity, Islam, Judaism and
Buddhism) on certain easy consensus issues such as drugs and
alcohol abuse, 194 that veneer of cooperation quickly fades in the face
of more contentious issues such as Orthodox education in public
schools and Orthodox-only access to the military for preaching
purposes. Finally, if the ROC was exempt from scrutiny, it certainly
would not have bothered to intervene on behalf of other religious
organizations caught in the NGO law’s onerous web. In this regard,
Archbishop Nikon’s views are revealing. 195
3. On crafting foreign policy
Another area of notable overlap between church and state is
demonstrated by recent foreign policy developments in Russia. Most
dramatically, the government has begun, in a throwback to
Communist days, to actively use the ROC as a means of
strengthening Russia’s “secular power.” In September 2007, Putin
aide Sergei Prikhodko breathlessly announced that “an important
event will take place on the eve of Putin’s visit to Abu Dhabi: a
sanctification of the corner-stone of a [ROC] temple, the first in the
194. Some of this work is done through the framework provided by the Inter-Religious
Council of Russia.
195. See Fagan, supra note 190 and accompanying text.

750

BLITT. FIN

707]

9/2/2008 7:10 PM

How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia

Arabian Peninsula. It will be built in the Emirate of Sharjah.” 196 The
stone-laying ceremony would be overseen by Metropolitan Kirill and
attended by the Russian president’s special representative in the
Middle East and Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexander Saltanov.
Prikhodko went further: “This is a historic event when an orthodox
temple will appear in this part of the world. Erection of the temple is
a decision, taken by the Emirates, indicating the attitude to Russia as
a whole. Therefore, this is a very important event even for Russia’s
secular power.” 197
This event is also significant insofar as it demonstrates the
Russian government and the ROC operating hand-in-hand to
advance Russia’s foreign policy and expand the global operations of
the Church. Acting in this way, the ROC appears to violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of its Basis of the Social Compact, discussed
below. Moreover, the readiness of ROC officials to allow the solemn
occasion of a cornerstone-laying ceremony to be associated with
temporal government power treads uncomfortably close to reviving
the Church’s not-too-distant communist legacy of acting
internationally as “practically a subsidiary [or] a sister company of
the KGB.” 198
This stark possibility is actually reinforced by President Putin’s
successful efforts in 2007 to reunite the ROC with the US-based
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA). 199 In Putin’s words, the
“revival of the [C]hurch’s unity is a crucial precondition for restoring
the unity of the entire Russian world, which has always seen
Orthodoxy as its spiritual foundation.” 200 Yet, approximately 100
members of the ROCA’s clergy—just under one-third of the total
number—rejected the merger because of lingering concerns that the

196. Putin’s visit to UAE to consolidate RF’s positions in Arab world, ORGANISATION OF
ASIA PACIFIC NEWS AGENCIES, Sept. 4, 2007.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Higgins, supra note 23, at A1. See discussion supra Part II, and especially supra
notes 23–26.
199. Alexander Osipovich, Pushing 2 Churches Closer to Each Other, THE MOSCOW
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008. Russian émigrés founded the ROCA in the 1920s after severing all ties
with the Moscow Patriarchate in response to Patriarch Sergy’s decision to swear loyalty to the
communist government. Thereafter, the term “sergianstvo” or sergeyism was used to describe
the ROC’s overly deferential relationship to the Russian government. See also supra Part II.
200. Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, Putin Calls Restoration of Russian Church’s
Unity Historic Event, INTERFAX, May 17, 2007, http://www.interfax.com/3/
272037/news.aspx.
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Moscow Patriarchate remained “too steeped in the Soviet-era
tradition of pleasing the [S]tate.” 201 According to at least one press
account, some dissenting priests raised concerns that the ROCA’s
infrastructure would now be used “to expand the spying capabilities
of the FSB.” 202 This move to reunite the ROCA and ROC, whether
a pet project or strategic objective of Putin, dramatically expands the
ROC’s international presence, and in turn it provides a significant
benefit to the Kremlin.
In addition to joint diplomatic endeavors with the State, the
ROC maintains a very active external relations department that hosts
visiting ambassadors and other high-level personalities. 203 Moreover,
ROC representatives have sought to develop relationships with
various international and regional fora, including the United
Nations, Council of Europe, and OSCE. To what extent these
undertakings are wholly independent from the State—particularly
given the remarkable overlap in policy approaches between the
two—remains to be seen. However, it is noteworthy that in a survey
of “Info-Digests” prepared by Russia’s Permanent Mission to the
UN over the past year, only a single issue from a total of forty-four
broke from an otherwise unwavering focus on government speeches,
spokespersons or representatives. 204 That single issue heralded
Metropolitan Kirill’s March 18, 2008 address during a panel
sponsored by the UN Human Rights Council on “Intercultural
Dialogue on Human Rights.” 205

201. Osipovich, supra note 199.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Press Release, Press Service of the Moscow Patriarchate, Sostoyalas Vstrecha
Predstoyatelya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi s Novim Poslom Respublicii Yemen v Rossii
(Mar. 4, 2008) available at http://www.patriarhia.ru/db/text/373429.html (publicizing
meetings with Yemen’s new ambassador to the Russian Federation, meeting with the French
ambassador, and a farewell meeting with U.S. Ambassador William Burns).
204. The list of “Info-Digests” is available from the Permanent Mission’s website at
http://www.geneva.mid.ru/digests/digests.html. The period covered runs from March 15,
2007 to March 19, 2008.
205. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Metropolitan
Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad will Address the 7th Session of the UN Human Rights
Council, 18 INFO DIGEST, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.geneva.mid.ru/
digests/digests.html.
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D. ROC Opposition to Criticism of the Regime

Internal criticism within the Church of the ROC’s intimacy with
the Russian government generally leads to ostracism or other
punishment. According to Bourdeaux, “the Moscow Patriarchate
acts as though it heads a state church, while the few Orthodox clergy
who oppose the church-state symbiosis face severe criticism, even
loss of livelihood. In recent times no bishop has criticized any aspect
of Kremlin policy.” 206 Arguably, one could reason that Archbishop
Nikon’s critique of the NGO law’s reporting requirements as
amounting to “state interference” qualifies as evidence that the ROC
is capable of government censure. However, Nikon’s “outrage”
doesn’t exactly rise to the level of criticism given that he heartily
endorses the government’s policy and reserves “criticism” only for
the fact that the law dares apply to the ROC. Indeed, all the
evidence points to a church that stifles internal criticism of the
regime (recall the fate of Father Sergei Taratukhin 207) and denounces
external criticism of the regime (recall the Church’s reactionary
criticism of NGOs). In the words of one journalist, “[The] intimate
alliance between the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin [is]
reminiscent of czarist days. Rigidly hierarchical, intolerant of dissent
and wary of competition, both share a vision of Russia’s future—
rooted in robust nationalism and at odds with Western-style liberal
democracy.” 208
True to form, the ROC views its position quite differently from
the reality depicted here. According to Aleksey II:
If the Church begins interfering in state affairs, it is natural that the
state will meddle in the affairs of the Church. And we know well
what this leads to. The Church must be in fact completely
separated from the state. Only then will it be able to appraise events
taking place in the country from the positions of spirituality and
morality. Only then will it be able to testify to the truth and, among

206. Bourdeaux, supra note 19.
207. See Blomfield, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
208. Higgins, supra note 23, at A1. During czarist rule, the Church “was a committed
supporter of the imperial rallying cry ‘orthodoxy, autocracy and nationhood.’” Blomfield,
supra note 133.
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other things, to tell the truth to the government instead of
unconditionally supporting it. 209

But even with an appreciation for the sentiment encapsulated
above, it is difficult to find a legitimate instance whereby the ROC
told the government “the truth.” The ROC did not speak out
against problems in Chechnya, and it failed to speak out against
restricting or denying religious rights to groups seeking to practice
their faith free from government obstacle or hindrance. As McGann
rightly observes, “Not only would such criticism evidence a break
with the tradition of subordination and a corresponding rise in
[C]hurch authority; but it would also indicate that [Aleksey’s]
[C]hurch could stand outside and above the politicking and
competition for favors that are so characteristic of Russian politics
today.” 210 Indeed, there is virtual consensus that under Aleksey’s
leadership, “the [C]hurch has continued to walk in near lockstep
with the secular Russian [S]tate, parroting the Kremlin line” at each
turn. 211 In this context, the ROC has failed to live up to the
Orthodox concept of sobornost, an early nineteenth-century ideal
which posited that “the [C]hurch has a dual responsibility: to serve
as a government critic, but also to submit to and to support just
rulers.” 212 Moreover, the ROC has gone even further; it now actively
attempts to drown out those who would presume to criticize the
government.
E. State Opposition to Criticism of the Church and Promotion of Its
“Cultural” Vision
In exchange for its unflagging support of the State, the ROC has
reaped its own benefits, including state protection and favoritism
despite constitutional norms to the contrary. Prior to the recent
reunification with the ROCA, 213 the ROC actively sought to
minimize the ROCA’s efforts to expand its jurisdiction into Russia.
For example, at the instigation of the Patriarchate, civil authorities in
Russia refused to register Free Orthodox parishes being supported by
209. Vladimir Shevelev, Interview: Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksy II,
MOSCOW NEWS, Apr. 22, 1994 (emphasis added).
210. McGann, supra note 26, at 15.
211. LaFraniere, supra note 24.
212. Hesli, supra note 90, at 47.
213. See supra Part IV(C)(3).
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the ROCA as part of its effort to build a foothold in the country. 214
Similarly, allegations were raised that KGB agents and police “used
violence against believers who wanted to have a priest of the Free
Orthodox Church.” 215 In St. Petersburg, a priest “was persecuted
with the cooperation of the city authorities for establishing a parish
of the Free Orthodox Church in an abandoned monastery church,
while the metropolitan of St. Petersburg threatened his parishioners
with excommunication.” 216 In a similar manner, the Russian
government has denied visas to foreign religious workers and
expelled foreign-born Catholic bishops in an attempt to limit the
influx of foreign religions and implement a policy of “one city one
bishop.” This policy permits “only one bishop—from the [ROC]—
in any city.” 217 This practice has drawn the attention of the PACE
and others. According to a 2002 PACE Committee report:
[T]he [ROC] sometimes plays a very dominant role and is often
seen to be the cause of discrimination in the implementation of the
[1997 law on religion]. Moreover, the concept of “canonical
territory”, which the Orthodox Church often uses . . . to refer to a
region or a so-called “traditional” religion which allegedly has
different ([i.e.] more extensive) rights than other religions, is
unacceptable by human rights standards as we in the Council of
Europe understand them. 218

More recently, “Roman Catholics, Protestants, Old Believers,
Molokans, and other alternative Orthodox communities” continue
to report difficulties in obtaining permission to build houses of

214. Armes, supra note 23, at 80.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Baradaran-Robison, supra note 28, at 917.
218. PACE Committee on Culture, Science and Education, Opinion on Russia’s Law on
Religion, Doc. 9409 ¶ 2(5) (Apr. 16, 2002), available at http://assembly.coe.int/
main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc02/edoc9409.htm. The Committee report
concluded that it “is unacceptable for local officials to send people e.g. to the Russian
Orthodox Church for approval on any course of action in the religious field before giving their
own approval.” Id. The Committee also took note of the fact that “[s]ome representatives of
different religious organisations were concerned about an ongoing ‘Orthodoxation’ of Russia.”
PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on Russia’s Law on Religion,
Doc. 9393 ¶¶ 5–17 (Mar. 25, 2002), http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/
workingdocs/doc02/edoc9393.htm#P132_25929.
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worship in Russia. 219 Yet on even broader terms, the Church has
sought to mainstream its vision of culture by condemning alternate
models that it opposes. The ROC has made a concerted effort
through its public communications to redefine “politically relevant
concepts” such as ‘spirituality,’ ‘morality,’ ‘worldview,’ and ‘culture,’
infusing each term with a definitive Christian Orthodox meaning. In
this way, the [C]hurch is able to appropriate words having broad
meaning in the public discourse and “fill it with specifically Christian
content.” 220 Willems stresses that “the significance and effect of this
discourse policy” should not be underestimated, since it is evident in
a wide range of policy areas where the Church is active, including
“military
chaplaincy,
media
policy
and
demographic
developments.” 221 Perhaps most notably, “political actors who are
pressing for the introduction of the ‘Foundations of Orthodox
Culture’ course . . . often employ terminology used by the ROC in
order to justify their decisions.” 222
In a much-publicized incident from Russia’s “culture war,”
Orthodox fundamentalists vandalized a Moscow art exhibition
entitled “Caution, Religion!” (‘Ostorozhno, religiya’). The
fundamentalists justified their actions by claiming that the exhibition
was blasphemous and “an insult to the main religion of our
country.” 223 The alleged vandals were tried and acquitted. However,
in a bizarre twist, prosecutors then charged two of the exhibition
organizers and an artist for inciting religious hatred. 224 The Moscow
Court found the exhibit organizers guilty of insulting the faith, and
fined them the equivalent of $3,500 each. 225
219. USCIRF, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 58 (May 2007), http://www.uscirf.gov/images/
stories/pdf/Annual_Report/2007annualrpt.pdf.
220. This is a very abbreviated summary of the case made by Willems. See Joachim
Willems, The Religio-Political Strategies of the Russian Orthodox Church as a “Politics of
Discourse”, 34 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y (No. 3) 287, 294 (Sept. 2006).
221. Id. at 295.
222. Id. The Foundations of Orthodox Culture course is discussed infra.
223. Zarakhovich, supra note 143; see also Willems, supra note 220, at 287. The exhibit
was sponsored by the Andrei Sakharov Center. The vandals “were supporters of the Rev.
Alexander Shargunov, an ultra-right Orthodox priest and founder of the Committee for the
Moral Revival of the Fatherland.” Guy Chazan, Russian Church-State Line Blurs, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 2005, at A12.
224. Osipovich, supra note 132.
225. Zarakhovich, supra note 143; see also Willems, supra note 220. It is worth noting
that according to Elena Bonner, the widow of scientist and Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov,
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More recent events also underscore the growing scope of special
protection afforded to the ROC’s definition of culture. A Moscow
art gallery owner, “specializing in art that tweaks the increasingly
powerful Orthodox Church and also the Kremlin,” was severely
beaten in 2006, yet authorities have failed to charge anyone with the
crime. 226 Similarly, in late 2007, the Russian Culture Minister
censored a state-sponsored exhibit of Russian contemporary art in
Paris. Although the show ultimately opened, “dozens of works were
pulled, including one, ‘Era of Mercy,’ by the Blue Noses group
showing two Russian policemen kissing in a birch grove.” 227 In
addition, the show’s curator, Andrei Yerofeyev, is now facing
criminal charges “initiated by a vice speaker of Parliament, by proKremlin youth groups and by members of the [C]hurch.” 228 Viktor
Yerofeyev, a prominent author (and Andrei Yerofeyev’s brother),
describes the unfolding situation in dire terms:
They’re creating, quickly, a kind of Iran situation, a new-old
civilization, an Orthodox civilization . . . . The climate has totally
changed. What was allowed the day before yesterday now is
dangerous. They don’t repress like the Soviets yet, but give them
two years, they will find the way. 229

In contrast, Rev. Chaplin describes the Church’s efforts to
change policy as simply renegotiating the line between legitimate
and illegitimate forms of self-expression:
[S]ome people believe that the freedom of creative self-expression
is absolute, while in fact even the international law states that this
freedom is subject to certain restrictions . . . . An absolute majority
of the Orthodox Christians believes that this freedom should not
cause an abuse of the feelings of believers or defilement of their
shrines. We should get into the way of making public policy and
decisions considerate of the position of both, the former and the
latter. 230

the trial signaled that the ROC was “now free to interfere in all aspects of secular life.” Chazan,
supra note 223.
226. Michael Kimmelman, Putin’s Last Realm to Conquer: Russian Culture, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2007, at A1.
227. Id. at A9.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Radical-Liberal, supra note 44.
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Yet, Kirill is far more upfront about the scope of the problem
stemming from liberal rules governing self-expression. The position
he espouses is a mirror image of the Church’s hostility to universal
human rights. The same argument is simply redirected at an internal
debate over the content and nature of Russian culture:
“[S]ecularism, the break with spiritual traditions, represents a great
threat to the existence of European civilization . . . . [It] not only
undermines the foundations of European identity but also provokes
conflict with religious groups which do not wish to subject
themselves to the general tendency of secularization.” 231 Ultimately,
the only cure for the problem of secularism and secular culture,
according to Kirill, is a return “to the Christian meaning of the
European values that underwent secularization” 232 and to religious
tradition that contains “a criterion for discerning good from evil.
From the perspective of this tradition, the following cannot be
accepted as normative: mockery of sacred things, abortion,
homosexuality, euthanasia and other actions that are actively
advocated today by the concept of human rights.” 233 Kirill argues
that this return to Christian religious sources is necessary because
“societies in which human rights become an instrument for the
emancipation of the instinct, in which the notions of good and evil are
confused and driven out by the idea of moral autonomy and
pluralism,” are destined to become “inhumane.” 234
Kirill’s message has been driven home repeatedly in the ROC’s
efforts to shape Russian culture across three different fronts. First,
according to Kirill, “[L]egislation should be sensitive to moral norms
that dominate in society . . . [it] should reflect moral norms shared
by the majority of society.” 235 Second, “the attitude of the mass
media toward the harmonization of human rights with morality is
very important.” 236 Finally, Krill argues:

231. Metropolitan Kirill, Giving a Soul to Europe, Introductory Speech at the European
Conference on Christian Culture (May 3–5, 2006), in 96 EUROPAICA BULL., May 11, 2006,
http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/96.aspx#2.
232. Id.
233. Metropolitan Kirill, Human Rights and Moral Responsibility. Part II, in 98
EUROPAICA BULL., May 25, 2006, http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/98.aspx#1.
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Id.
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[T]he vacuum of moral education in our society must be filled . . . .
The [S]tate, in close cooperation with social institutions . . .
including . . . the country’s religious communities, such [sic]
handle this preparation . . . the state should take care to work out
legislation regulating the access of religious organizations to public
educational structures, social service, health and the armed forces.
In doing so[,] all religious communities in the country should labor
in these areas according to their representation in society. 237

The issue of law being informed by the “moral norms” of the
ROC is reflected in a number of recent legislative initiatives,
including the amended laws on freedom of conscience and NGOs
discussed above. 238 On the mass media front, the ROC is actively
pursuing efforts to have the State set up a “morality police” for
television and other media. At a meeting with President Putin in
November, 2007—which some claimed was prompted by the desire
to secure Orthodox voter support in the parliamentary elections—
Aleksey II appealed for the government to “establish a public council
to oversee issues of morality in the mass media” and “assume
appropriate regulating functions.” 239 This push was followed by
ROC claims that the mainstream media “intentionally ignores [the
Church’s] opinion on acute problems of modern society.” 240 Even
when the ROC “speaks up,” it claims to be ignored because the
“informational ghetto of the Soviet times and years of early
democracy, has not been universally eliminated.” 241
Without treading into the Orwellian nature of this statement
(given Putin’s stranglehold on Russian media outlets 242), it didn’t
take long for the Church’s position to register in the policy realm.
Several months after Aleksey’s meeting with Putin, Sergey Markov,
deputy head of the State Duma Committee for Public Associations

237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Recall the ROC’s lobbying effort to amend the 1990 law on Freedom of
Conscience, and also Archbishop Nikon’s strong endorsement of the ideas underpinning the
amendments to Russia’s NGO law.
239. Church Head Calls for Council to Regulate Media, 46 MOSCOW NEWS, Nov. 22,
2007, available at http://mnweekly.rian.ru/national/20071122/55291718.html; see also
Patriarch Alexy II Claims Morality Council to Regulate Mass Media, PRAVDA, Nov. 19, 2007,
http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/19-11-2007/101187-TV_broadcast-0.
240. The Moscow Patriarchate: Church Is Still Too Often Placed in Informational Ghetto,
INTERFAX, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4160.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Masha Lipman, Putin’s Puppet Press, WASH. POST, May 20, 2008, at A13.

759

BLITT. FIN

9/2/2008 7:10 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2008

and Religious Organizations, decried Russian television as
“smash[ing] world records for criminalization and amorality,” and
concluded that a “Public council on television is necessary.” 243
Markov, probably with little irony, also called for establishing “a
separate Orthodox channel—not only a decimeter channel, it should
be national.” 244 In addition, Russia’s Association of Orthodox
Journalists announced their intention to establish “a public council
on morality on Russian federal TV channels” that would “give its
judgment on the TV administration’s actions.” 245 Finally, and
perhaps only by coincidence, Itar-Tass reported that Russia’s
Prosecutor-General’s Office filed proposals with parliament to “hold
internet-providers [sic] responsible for objectionable and extremist
materials found on the Internet,” including material deemed
offensive to public morality or safety. 246
Clearly, regulation of morality in the media is an example of the
ROC actively driving, rather than passively following, formation of
government policy. It also represents another policy field upon
which the ROC will seek to impose its views. Admittedly, it is
premature to ascertain the full scope of the ROC’s influence in this
matter. Nevertheless, if its past efforts with respect to addressing the
“vacuum of moral education” are any indication, the ROC will
surely maintain sufficient patience for its efforts to come to
fruition. 247
F. On Education
To date, the Russian public education system is perhaps the most
contentious area where the ROC attempts to insinuate its religious
and cultural traditions. From the Church’s Basis of the Social Concept:
243. Political analyst Markov urges to create moral TV in Russia, INTERFAX, Mar. 25,
2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4445.
244. Id.
245. Orthodox journalists to establish a public council on morality on Russian TV,
INTERFAX, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4159.
246. Russian Prosecutors Ask Parliament to Regulate Internet Content, THE OTHER
RUSSIA, Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/03/18/russian-prosecutorsask-parliament-to-regulate-internet-content/. The Internet has been labeled the “last media
refuge” of Russia. See Brian Whitmore, Kremlin Moves to Rein in Last Media Refuge, RADIO
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, Mar. 12, 2008, http://rfe.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/
03/80ab2cbe-2a25-4a63-b74945f9bdebae43.html.
247. Recall the seven years it took the ROC to secure amendments to the 1990 law on
freedom of conscience.
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The Church believes it beneficial and necessary to conduct optional
classes on Christian faith in secular schools . . . . The [C]hurch
authorities should conduct dialogue with the government aimed to
seal in the legislation . . . the Church has also established Orthodox
institutions of general education and expects that they will be
supported by the [S]tate. 248

After 1991, Russian authorities opened the doors of public
education in search of a new source for vospitanie, or upbringing, to
replace the discredited communist program of moral education. 249
This outreach exposed schools to varied influences, including
programs developed by foreign religious groups (and supported by
the Russian Ministry of Education). The ROC rejected this
approach, claiming that the openness brought “out a very negative
reaction from our [C]hurch and from most of the population.” 250
Consequently, the Patriarchate brought its influence to bear on the
Ministry and forced the termination of partnerships with these
religious groups. 251 According to Glanzer and Petrenko, these
changes heralded the “second phase” in Russia’s developing
education policy, what they label the “Orthodox Revival and Partial
Establishment.” Yet, despite the ROC’s efforts to persuade the
government that Orthodoxy merited a special place in the required
curriculum—and that failure to do so would leave the State
“doomed to self-destruction” 252—the Russian Ministry of Education
resisted developing a special partnership with the ROC and
“continued to affirm a pluralistic approach” 253 through the 1990s.
By 2001, the ROC returned to the classrooms, seeking approval
for greater Orthodox content within the education system. Patriarch
248. Official Web Server of the Moscow Patriarchate, The Basis of the Social Concept, Art.
XIV(3), http://www.mospat.ru/index.php?mid=183&lng=1 (last visited Aug. 13, 2008)
(emphasis added).
249. Perry L. Glanzer & Konstantin Petrenko, Religion and Education in PostCommunist Russia: Russia’s Evolving Church-State Relations, 49 J. CHURCH AND ST. 53, 58
(2007). Some of these Western religious groups claimed to have “trained over 50,000 Russian
educators to teach a Christian ethics curriculum.” Id. at 58.
250. Id. at 59 (citing PERRY L. GLANZER, THE QUEST FOR RUSSIA’S SOUL:
EVANGELICALS AND MORAL EDUCATION IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA 178 (Baylor U. Press
2002).
251. Glanzer & Petrenko, supra note 249, at 60 (noting that some groups continued to
work on the local level).
252. Id. (citing Basic Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2000, XIV.3,
available at http://www.mospat.ru/index.php?mid=194 (last visited Aug. 14, 2008)).
253. Glanzer & Petrenko, supra note 249, at 60.
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Aleksey II declared, “We will try again to persuade the government
of the necessity of introducing the history of Orthodox culture in the
curriculum of the schools.” 254 Within a year, the Russian Ministry of
Education had taken steps to introduce a new course into the core
curriculum entitled: “Foundations of the Orthodox Culture.” 255
In a survey undertaken in August 2004, the Institute for the
Study of Religions in the CIS and Baltic States found that a syllabus
for a course on the Foundations of Orthodox Culture asked fifthgraders, inter alia, “what the feast of the Nativity of the Mother of
God means to [them]” and required students to compose a personal
“message to the Mother of God.” 256 Further, in some areas, the local
Orthodox diocese would organize field trips to religious sites for
students of state schools: “Leaders of the pilgrimage groups speak
about the basics of Orthodoxy, the sacraments, the Ten
Commandments, for 2-4 hours on the way; in short, the pilgrimage
includes missionary and catechetical activity.” 257
In part because of a backlash against the course and difficulties
surrounding its implementation, the Ministry soon entered a third
phase of “strict separationism.” This new phase endorsed support for
other voluntary classes on religion outside of the required program.
But part of the problem in reaching a clear federal standard stemmed
from regional control over a percentage of the state school
curriculum that was used as a point of entry for unregulated religious
instruction. In 2007, disputes over the course continued. An open
letter to President Putin from notable members of the Russian
Academy of Sciences expressed concern over “the growing
clericalisation of the Russian society” and the “active penetration of
the [C]hurch into all spheres of public life.” 258 The letter’s authors
further asserted that a mandatory educational program, even if
limited only to the foundations of Orthodox culture, would be
254. Id. at 61. (citing Patriarch Thinks History of Orthodoxy Should Be Studied in Schools,
NTV, Jan. 26, 2001).
255. Glanzer & Petrenko, supra note 249, at 61.
256. Geraldine Fagan, Patchy Local Provision of Orthodox Culture Classes, FORUM 18
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1022.
257. Id.
258. Scientists Alarmed by Clericalisation in Russia, ROC Disagrees, ITAR-TASS, July 26,
2007. The appeal had ten authors, among them Nobel Prize winners Zhores Alfyorov and
Vitaly Ginzburg, and Russian Academy of Sciences members Andrei Vorobyov and Sergei
Inge-Vechtomov. See Russian Academicians Oppose Church Interference In Public Life, ITARTASS, July 22, 2007.
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inappropriate in “a multiethnic, multiconfessional country.” 259 The
ROC’s response was swift. Aleksey II stated that the “[atheists’]
apprehensions about the Church pushing the country towards a
collapse . . . sound strange as a minimum.” 260 He further added that
the letter was “an echo of the atheistic propaganda of the past.” 261
Kirill has since labeled the authors “gentlemen [who] want to see a
return to the Soviet Union.” 262
Nevertheless, in the regions where schools taught a religious
curriculum, the “Foundations” course “continued expanding, albeit
to a smaller degree than previously.” 263 In the Voronezh region and
the city of Ulyanovsk on the Volga, the “Foundations” course
became part of the mandatory curriculum. Likewise, Junior Cadet
and Cossack schools in the southern Rostov region “introduced
mandatory studies of the Law of the Lord.” 264 Other reports have
noted that “localities in Russia are increasingly decreeing that to
receive a proper public school education, children should be steeped
in the ways of the [ROC], including its traditions, liturgy and
historic figures.” 265 Still, most regions opted for courses
incorporating several religions, albeit limited to those defined as
“traditional.” 266
The ROC maintains that the “Foundations” courses “are
cultural, not religious,” 267 and so may form part of the State’s
educational program. This stance ties back to Willems’ discussion of
the ROC’s discourse policy, which seeks to redefine “politically
relevant concepts” by infusing terms like culture with definitive
Christian Orthodox meaning. But beyond this effort, it is worth
underscoring that the 1992 Education Law establishes “the secular
character of education in [state] institutions at [the] national and
259. Fagan, supra note 256.
260. Alexandrova, supra note 62.
261. Clifford Levy, Welcome or Not, Orthodoxy Is Back in Russia’s Public Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007.
262. Spiegel Online International, supra note 52.
263. Russian Human Rights Groups Present Annual Report On Religious Freedom,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Feb. 23, 2008, available at Westlaw 2/23/08 WRLDNWSC
22:39:04 [hereinafter Russian Human Rights Groups].
264. Id. ROC efforts to promote the teaching of its curriculum also continued “in areas
such as Kursk and Tambov.” Glanzer & Petrenko, supra note 249, at 64.
265. Levy, supra note 261.
266. Russian Human Rights Groups, supra note 263.
267. Levy, supra note 261.
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regional level,” 268 and prohibits activity by religious organizations in
those institutions. 269
Current reform plans in Russia’s parliament would abolish the
regional mechanism that introduced the “Foundations of Orthodox
Culture” curriculum. However, the Education Ministry maintains
that any reform will preserve the ability of individual schools to
determine curriculum content, “taking into account regional or
national particularities, school type, educational requirements and
pupils’ requests.” 270 On this issue, Putin has remarked that the
Constitution “says that the Church is separate from the state. You
know how I feel, including towards the [ROC]. But if anyone thinks
that we should proceed differently, that would require a change to
the Constitution. I do not believe that is what we should be doing
now.” 271
Some observers have speculated that government ambivalence to
the ROC’s educational plans stems from the fact that modifying the
education system will potentially implicate millions of citizens,
whereas the 1997 amendments to the law on freedom of conscience
“would not have been felt by most citizens.” 272 Ultimately, Glanzer
and Petrenko find that the Russian government “shows little
consistency in its approach to church-state issues in education.”
Instead, the State seeks to have it both ways, affirming strict
separationism concerning funding but endorsing “historical
pluralism when it comes to regulating religion in state or private
education.” 273 The authors rightly conclude that the ROC remains
dissatisfied with this arrangement and “will likely continue to press
for managed pluralism or partial establishment, especially in
funding.” 274

268. Willems, supra note 220, at 288.
269. Fagan, supra note 256.
270. Id.
271. Id. The overt political nature of this comment will not be lost on readers, since on
every other issue discussed herein, Putin has comfortably endorsed, even advanced the
breakdown of separation of church and state. Moreover, Putin did not say current practices
should be scaled back to accord with the Constitution. See Levy, supra note 261.
272. Fagan, supra note 256.
273. Glanzer & Petrenko, supra note 249, at 73.
274. Id. John Basil speculates that a decision to “settle this issue” on the part of
government officials will only come when it is deemed to serve “the interests of the [S]tate.”
John D. Basil, Orthodoxy and Public Education in the Russian Federation: The First Fifteen
Years, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 27, 52 (2007).
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According to Aleksey II, the Church had been successful in its
negotiations with the State insofar as “[Foundations] of Orthodox
Culture” is expected to be “taught in general schools as of 2009 as a
[sic] element of the mandatory course called ‘The Spiritual and
Moral Culture.’” 275 Indeed, as recently as “the summer of 2007 a
number of regions, including Ulyanovsk, Voronezh, Bryansk,
Kaluga, Smolensk and Tver were planning to introduce the course
into secondary schools in the forthcoming school year.” 276 Moreover at
a January 2008 meeting with representatives from the Church,
scientific, and government communities, Aleksey reaffirmed the
ROC’s intent “to do everything possible to make education in the
Fatherland really conforming to the interests of the society’s
development.” 277 He insisted that “[t]eaching the [Foundations] of
Orthodox culture at schools [remained] as important as ever.” 278
Aleksey also expressed the ROC’s desire “that serious steps to
overcome artificial barriers preventing cooperation” between it and
the Russian State would be taken in 2008. 279 He further stated that
“casting religion out from public sphere [was] unacceptable.” 280
For the Church, the secondary school curriculum on culture
represents one more exploitable crack in what remains of the divide
separating church from state. This course, “a compulsory subject
during [the] first term for all high school pupils in Russia,” 281 seeks
to help “model a culture which is not influenced by the products of
mass Western culture but which sets up alternative values and
concepts which are orientated towards Russia’s historical
experience.” 282 For the ROC, this mandate falls squarely within its
conception that “Orthodoxy is not just a significant element of
Russian culture but lies at its very basis.” 283 It further enables the

275. Alexandrova, supra note 62.
276. John Anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?,
61 J. INT’L AFFAIRS (No. 1) 185, 197 (2007) (emphasis added).
277. Patriarch Calls For Teaching Spiritual Culture at Russian Schools, WORLD NEWS
CONNECTION, Jan. 28, 2008, available at Westlaw 1/28/08 WRLDNWSC 13:06:26.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Patriarch Aleksy II, supra note 179. This, despite separation of religion from the
“public sphere” being wholly in accord with the Russian Constitution.
281. Willems, supra note 220, at 291.
282. Id. at 292 (internal quotes omitted).
283. Id. Indeed, Willems points out that according to the ROC’s Basis of the Social
Concept, “promulgated by the Bishops’ Council in 2000, the Latin word cultura is
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Church to perpetuate a discourse policy that manipulates the plain
meaning of “culture.” Thus, any lesson plan directed at building
Russian culture necessarily must incorporate a component related to
Russian Orthodoxy. 284 In other words, the course provides an
avenue of religious engagement within the secondary school setting
that mirrors the model sought by the ROC on the elementary school
level.
It is important to recall, particularly in the context of curriculum
“reform,” that the ROC’s “best practices” and desired changes run
contrary to Russia’s international law obligations. Even if the ROC
or Russian State makes the case that current practices in Russia
related to religious liberty and education do not fall “outside the
norm of other countries considered to be liberal democracies,” 285 in
all likelihood, these practices are indeed ultra vires of the
Constitution and also would be deemed unjustifiable under the
European Convention. This reasoning is strengthened by a recent
ECHR decision that rejected Norway’s religious instruction program
due to its stilted nature favoring a single, yet constitutionally
enshrined, state religion. According to the majority decision in
Folgero, Norway’s state education program “KRL” (Christianity,
Religion and Philosophy), violated that country’s obligations under
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention. 286 The
violation arose because the government failed to take “sufficient care
that information and knowledge included in the curriculum be
conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner.” 287

etymologically derived from the word cultus” and that it follows, from the Church’s
perspective, “that any cultivated human being needs a religious education and religious ties,
and conversely that without religion no human being can be cultivated.” Id. at 292–93. In
other words, for the Church, culture translates into faith.
284. Id. at 292.
285. Glanzer and Petrenko, supra note 249, at 73.
286. Russia ratified the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms
other than those already included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No.: 009) on May 5, 1998, http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=009&CM=7&DF=3/19/2008&
CL=ENG. Article 2 of the Protocol provides that: “No person shall be denied the right to
education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” Id.
287. Folgerø & Others v. Norway, Application no. 15472/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶ 102 (June
29, 2007).
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Remarkably, this happened despite the fact that Norway’s
Constitution explicitly recognizes a state church. For example,
Article 2 stipulates that the “Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall
remain the official religion of the State. The inhabitants professing it
are bound to bring up their children in the same.” 288 Further, under
Article 16, “[t]he King ordains all public church services and public
worship, all meetings and assemblies dealing with religious matters,
and ensures that public teachers of religion follow the norms
prescribed for them.” 289
The ECHR’s decision is instructive in the context of Russia’s
legal obligations for a number of reasons. First, it establishes that
even where a state constitutionally acknowledges an official religion,
in the words of the Court, “democracy does not simply mean that
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be
achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities
and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.” 290 In this regard, the
state remains under an obligation to “take care that information or
knowledge included in [educational curricula] is conveyed in an
objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State is forbidden to
pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not
respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions.” 291
Second, in the face of Russia’s de jure secularism, the case
exposes the true scope of the damage caused to separation of church
and state and to principles of religious equality and
nondiscrimination. In other words, it is one thing for Norway—a
country with an official state religion—to seek to inculcate the
religious doctrines of that faith above all others. It is altogether
another for Russia—an officially secular state—to seek to do the
same.
It is also worth noting that the UN Human Rights Committee
(HRC) addressed the same issue through its own complaint
mechanism almost three years earlier. The HRC found that
Norway’s KRL program could not “be said to meet the requirement
of being delivered in a neutral and objective way, unless the system

288. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY art. 2, available at http://
www.constitution.org/cons/norway/dok-bn.html.
289. Id. art. 16.
290. Folgerø, Application no. 15472/02 at ¶ 84(f).
291. Id. at ¶ 84(h) (emphasis added).
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of exemption in fact leads to a situation where the teaching provided
to those children and families opting for such exemption will be
neutral and objective.” 292 It then went on to find that the exemption
scheme was inadequate. 293 As a consequence, the HRC concluded
that the Norwegian law constituted a violation of Article 18(4) of
the ICCPR, 294 relating to the State’s obligation to “have respect for
the liberty of parents . . . to ensure the religious and moral education
of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” 295
Applying the HRC’s findings to current developments in Russia
leads one to the reasonable conclusion that a similar violation of
ICCPR obligations could be found in the context of the
“Foundations of Orthodox Culture” course. This conclusion is only
reinforced when Russia’s official secular status is factored into the
equation.
G. Explaining It All Away
1. The ROC’s Basis of the Social Concept
In the face of all the events, trends, and factors discussed above,
the ROC might simply assert that everything it has done has been in
accordance with the Church’s vision, and without soiling its hands in
the temporal muck of state politics. According to the Basis of the
Social Concept:
[T]he Church can cooperate with the [S]tate in affairs which
benefit the Church herself, as well as the individual and society. For
the Church this co-operation should be part of her salvific mission,
which embraces comprehensively the concern for man. The Church
is called to take part in building human life in all spheres where it is
possible and, in doing so, to join efforts with representatives of the
secular authority. 296

292. Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication
No. 1155/2003, ¶ 14.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003 (Nov. 23, 2004).
293. The Committee concluded that requiring parents to “acquaint themselves with [a]
subject . . . clearly of a religious nature” in order to secure an exemption was a “considerable
burden.” Id.
294. Id. at ¶ 14.7.
295. ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 18.4.
296. Official Web Server of the Moscow Patriarchate, supra note 248, art. III.8.
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This important document reflects the ROC’s official position on
relations with state and secular society and lists sixteen specific areas
(from a non-exhaustive list) 297 wherein the church is permitted to
cooperate with government, including:
(b) concern for the preservation of morality in society;
(c) spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and formation;
...
(f ) dialogue with governmental bodies of all branches and levels on
issues important for the Church and society, including the
development of appropriate laws, by-laws, instructions and
decisions . . . . 298

Perhaps not surprisingly, this article focused most of its
discussion on these areas. In turn, ROC leaders readily assert that
their vision of partnership—because it conveniently sidesteps the
designation of “state church”—frees the ROC from any possible
culpability in diminishing the constitutional structures of the State,
particularly as these structures relate to secularism, equality, and nondiscrimination. As Aleksey II asserted, “We don’t want political and
state influence. We want spiritual influence. We are neither for the
left nor the right. We are for eternal things. The [C]hurch must be
separated from the state—that is my firm conviction.” 299 And in a
similarly framed rejoinder to United States government criticism,
Metropolitan Kirill insisted that:
[O]ur Church is in no way striving to receive the status of a state
Church . . . . On the other hand, our study of past experience has
convinced us of the necessity of constructing a partnership with the
[S]tate, based on mutual beneficial cooperation in the interests of
society as a whole. Such a partnership would presuppose the
conclusion of agreements which would create the proper legal
foundation for the Church’s social ministry. 300

In reaction to the academics’ open letter to Putin discussed
above, Metropolitan Kirill sounded the same line, albeit with greater
incredulity: “We have not healed the wounds inflicted by terror and
297. “Church-state co-operation is also possible in some other areas if it contributes to
the fulfilment of the tasks enumerated.” Id.
298. Id. at c, d, f.
299. Pope, supra note 51.
300. Metropolitan Kirill, supra note 176.
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genocide against the [ROC], and we have just begun to rise from
the knees. So what clericalization of society can be in question?!” 301
Putting aside questions regarding the legitimacy of the ROC’s
remarkably open-ended ability to “partner” with the government, its
actions still appear—in light of the evidence above—to strain any
credible definition of church-state separation. First, the ROC
overreached by vigorously lobbying for policy concerns rather than
merely “partnering.” Second, the ROC has outright violated—if not
in letter then at least in spirit—its own Basis of the Social Concept
provision prohibiting “clergy and canonical church structures” from
supporting or cooperating with the State, inter alia, in “political
struggle, election agitation, [and] campaigns in support of particular
political parties and public and political leaders.” 302
On this latter point, this article has already noted that the
Church has asserted very public positions amounting to virtual
campaign endorsements in various elections. This practice has only
grown bolder with the recent election of Dmitry Medvedev. When
questioned about the Church’s effusive welcome of Putin’s decision
to name Medvedev as his successor and its call for Putin to continue
on as prime minister, Metropolitan Kirill said, “We didn’t react
positively because Vladimir Putin supports him, but because
Medvedev is an experienced politician. And the idea of Putin
becoming the head of the government does not contradict our
[C]onstitution.” 303
Strangely, what’s missing from Kirill’s statement is any denial of
support proffered to a specific candidate or political party. Moreover,
in the face of ROC practices and actions that blatantly contradict
Russia’s Constitution, Kirill’s invocation of that document here as an
attempt to legitimate the ROC’s endorsement comes off at best as
cherry-picking and at worst as pure hypocrisy.
What emerges from all of this is a situation whereby the ROC
refutes its intent or desire to be sanctioned as an official state church,
but all the while seeks to expand “unofficially” its influence on
virtually all aspects of Russian society through “cooperation” with
the government. As McGann points out, it would appear that
301. Church Invites Academicians to Serious Dialogue, ITAR-TASS, Aug. 13, 2007.
302. Official Web Server of the Moscow Patriarchate, supra note 248, at art. III.8. It
should also be pointed out that according to this policy document, the list of activities where
church-state cooperation is permissible is significantly longer than the list of prohibitions.
303. Spiegel Online International, supra note 52.
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Aleksey II has consciously adopted “this highly insincere strategy of
shifting back and forth between constitutional and church principles
whenever he deems it convenient.” 304 Remarkably, the ROC expects
that by forgoing the formal label of state church it can continue to
unduly influence government policy without fear of government
interference in its own affairs and without any accountability for its
own actions. In this way, fears expressed by some that the ROC
“runs the risk of (self-) instrumentalisation for political purposes” by
“[s]tanding close to the [S]tate and assuming responsibility for it”
are in fact ill-placed. 305 As Vitaly Ginzburg, one of the signers of the
open letter to Putin has succinctly observed, the ROC “wants to
penetrate everywhere and influence everything, but it does not want
to bear any responsibility for it.” 306 By continually insisting that it is
opposed to church-state fusion and does not care to become the
official state church of Russia, the ROC is able to exert as much
influence as the regime will willingly accept—without any liability for
the ensuing policy or constitutional consequences. Ironically, a
recent article evaluating the unintended consequences of state
religion tends to confirm that the ROC truly does retain the best of
both worlds by forgoing a push for official recognition. According to
the authors of this survey, “any positive benefits to the [C]hurch
with direct support from the [S]tate are outweighed by indirect
effects that undermine the [C]hurch’s autonomy and its authority
with the general populace.” 307
2. The state needs the church
To the extent that it too has abetted the current relationship, the
State is equally culpable of obviating separation of church and state,
but for different motives. As noted, Yeltsin was quick to recognize
ROC support as “a highly valuable political asset in his bid for the
presidency,” and did not hesitate to capitalize on, among other
things, “highly publicized participation in church activities.” 308
Indeed, as early as the “first half of the 1990s, the Church inspired

304. McGann, supra note 26, at 24.
305. Willems, supra note 220, at 296.
306. Osipovich, supra note 132.
307. Charles M. North and Carl R. Gwin, Religious Freedom and the Unintended
Consequences of State Religion, 71 S. ECON. J. 103, 104 (2004).
308. McGann, supra note 26, at 16.
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greater trust among the Russian population than most other social
and political institutions.” 309 In surveys taken over the past several
years, the Church has continued to rank as the most trusted
organization in Russia, alongside the army. 310 The ROC places ahead
of “the central and local governments, the Duma, the police and the
judiciary system, the media, and the banks.” 311 As part of this
support, Aleksey II “has become one of the country’s most
influential public figures.” 312 Thus, the “[C]hurch’s support [is] a
powerful source of legitimacy,” 313 given its deep roots in Russian
history and the high degree of credibility most Russians ascribe to it.
None of this was lost during Putin’s tenure, which has been
characterized as harnessing “[n]ationalism, based on the Orthodox
faith . . . as [its] major ideological resource.” 314 In a November 2007
address to ROC clergy, Putin remarked:
Russian Orthodoxy has a particular role in our country’s history, in
the formation of our statehood, culture, morals and spirituality. . . .
Today, we greatly value the [ROC’s] efforts to return to our
country’s life the ideals and values that served as our spiritual
references for so many centuries. . . .
. . . The [S]tate and the Church have ample scope for working
together to strengthen morality and educate the young generation,
and of course, to preserve our country’s spiritual and cultural
heritage. 315

Similarly, Putin, even more than Yeltsin, comfortably wrapped
himself in the cloak of ROC support as a means of enlarging his
political leverage. During the run-up to the 2007 elections, Putin
held a meeting with Patriarch Aleksey II that some analysts
309. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (GPO) FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RUSSIA:
A COUNTRY STUDY (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1996), available at http://countrystudies.us/
russia/38.htm.
310. McGann, supra note 26, at 22; see also Lee Trepanier, Nationalism and Religion in
Russian Civil Society: An Inquiry into the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience,” in CIVIL
SOCIETY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 57, 64–73, 67 (Christopher Marsh &
Nikolas K. Gvosdev eds., 2002).
311. Gaskova, supra note 36, at 119.
312. MEMBERS OF THE SPEAKER’S ADVISORY GROUP ON RUSSIA, supra note 61.
313. Shterin & Richardson, supra note 31, at 334.
314. Zarakhovich, supra note 143.
315. President Vladimir Putin, Speech at Meeting with Russian Orthodox Clergy to
Mark the Ninetieth Anniversary of the Patriarchate’s Restoration (Nov. 20, 2007), in
JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST, 2007-#240, Nov. 20, 2007.
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concluded “was part of an effort by the Kremlin to encourage
religious Russians to vote.” 316
Some observers have argued that while Orthodoxy served to
legitimize the Putin regime, its “support [was] reserved and
skeptical. The relationship between religion and politics is, therefore,
complex, as the [C]hurch plays a dual role of legitimator and
critic.” 317 Objectively, one has to look very hard to find any
compelling examples of genuine government criticism emanating
from the Patriarchate. Even if one finds the ROC has condemned
violence and terrorism in generalities, it has shown no public
inclination “to pose difficult questions” about government policies
that may be fueling separatist activities and crimes motivated by
xenophobia. 318 As Lawrence Uzzell has concluded, “As long as
instinctive servility remains part of [its] genetic code,” the ROC “can
usually be counted on to avoid speaking up on issues where their
moral heritage contradicts the [S]tate’s current policies.” 319 And still,
even if the ROC’s support is taken as “reserved and skeptical,” it
nevertheless remains suspect given its deleterious impact on the
Constitution and the condition of genuine religious freedom in
Russia.
V. POSTSCRIPT 2008: FOUR MORE YEARS!
In keeping with unconstitutional practice—and the ROC’s
tendency to read out key sections of its own Basis of the Social
Concept—the 2008 presidential elections signaled an unprecedented
level of church intervention. The day after Putin backed Medvedev
as his preferred candidate, Aleksey II told a gaggle of reporters, “If
Vladimir Vladimirovich puts him forward, this is a carefully reasoned
decision, and we welcome it.” 320 Aleksey also called Putin’s plan a
“great blessing for Russia” 321 and observed that “[f]or the nation, of

316. Putin, Medvedev Celebrate Russian Orthodox Easter Together Ahead of Kremlin
Handover, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 27, 2008, available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST, 2008#828, Apr. 28 2008 [hereinafter Orthodox Easter].
317. Hesli, supra note 90, at 43.
318. James W. Warhola, Religion and Politics Under the Putin Administration:
Accommodation and Confrontation within “Managed Pluralism,” 49 J. CHURCH AND STATE
75, 77–78 (2007).
319. Lawrence A. Uzzell, Autocracy or Theocracy?, MOSCOW TIMES, July 29, 2004.
320. Osipovich, supra note 132.
321. Higgins, supra note 23.
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course, the most important event will be the election of the new
president and our people should make the correct choice[,] and it is
not words and promises they should react to but the specific
achievements of each candidate.” 322 At Christmas 2007, Aleksey had
the chance to offer his greetings to Medvedev in a service at the
Cathedral of Christ the Savior that was prominently featured on state
television. 323 At that time, the patriarch applauded Medvedev’s
support of the Church, including his backing of legislative
amendments that would mandate state recognition of diplomas
conferred by ROC seminaries and serve to qualify clergy to teach
religion in state universities. 324 “Before we used to hit a brick wall
when we raised this question.” 325 The amendments passed their
second reading in the State Duma in February 2008. 326
Arguably, the ROC will assert that these are “general” comments
designed only to encourage a citizen’s civic duty; but really, at this
point, the intended message is clear: follow the ROC’s endorsement
and vote for Putin’s successor.
Not to be outdone, in the midst of the 2007 parliamentary
election season, Putin added:
Orthodoxy has always had a special role in shaping our
statehood, our culture, our morals . . .
....
I am sure the Orthodox Christians like other citizens will show
strong activity [at the polls].
....

322. Russians Should Judge Candidates by “Achievements,” RUSSIA & CIS GENERAL
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 26, 2007.
323. Osipovich, supra note 132. Aleksey’s influence on Russia’s “estimated 100 million
Orthodox worshippers is immense.” Blomfield, supra note 133.
324. Victor Yasmann, In Focus: Putin’s Choice: A Profile of Dmitry Medvedev, RADIO
FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Mar. 10, 2008, available at http://www.cdi.org/
russia/johnson/2008-53-33.cfm.
325. Patriarch Alexsy II and Other Leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church Have Voiced
Their Support for President Vladimir Putin’s Anointing of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev as His Successor, 125 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 21, 21 (2008).
326. Analysis: Russia—Outlook for Relations Between Medvedev, Orthodox Church, US
OPEN SOURCE CENTER, May 7, 2008.
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We highly appreciate the [C]hurch’s striving to revive in Russian
society ideals and values which have for ages served us as moral
guidelines . . . . 327

On the day of presidential elections in Russia, members of
Election Commission No. 2614 carefully placed a ballot box in their
van and drove to the working residence of the patriarch. Amidst a
throng of radio and print media, and with TV cameras rolling, the
stage was set: Aleksey walked into the room, sat down at the head of
a wide table, and cast his ballot into the hand-delivered box.
Following this very stirring and orchestrated display of state
apparatchiks 328 coming before the Church, Aleksey encouraged all
Russians “to thank Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who for eight
years served selflessly.” 329 He further expressed his wish that the next
president “continue the course carried out” by President Putin. 330
Shortly after Medvedev’s predictable victory, Aleksey added, “It is
gratifying to know that during the years of your previous work in
government posts. [sic] You always strove to make a significant
contribution to the development of fruitful cooperation with the
Russian Orthodox Church and kept watch over national
interests.” 331
It is worth noting that Dmitry Medvedev, like Putin, is a
practicing member of the ROC. For his part, Medvedev has said the
State “must create conditions to satisfy a need of a person to go to
church,” and that “the Church assumes the function of improving
the society.” 332 Not unlike Yeltsin’s casual if contrived stroll in the
327. Oleg Shchedrov, Putin Promises Support to Russian Orthodox Church, REUTERS,
Nov.
19,
2007,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/
idUSL196077120071119.
328. This is a colloquial Russian term that denotes an unquestioningly loyal functionary
or official within a large organization, traditionally the Communist party. See AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 68 (4th ed. 2004); NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY
73 (2d ed. 2005).
329. Press Release, Press Service of the Moscow Patriarchate, Predstoyatel Russkoy
Tserkvi Prinyal Uchastiye v Viborach Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Head of Russian
Church took part in the election of the President of the Russian Federation] (Mar. 2, 2008)
(available
at
http://209.85.135.104/translate_c?hl=en&langpair=ru|en&u=http://
www.patriarhia.ru/db/text/372399.html).
330. Sophia Kishkovsky, Russia’s Religious Leaders Congratulate Putin Heir Medvedev,
ECUMENICAL NEWS INTERNATIONAL, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.eni.ch/featured/article
.php?id=1710.
331. Id.
332. Scientists Alarmed By Clericalisation in Russia, ROC Disagrees, supra note 258.
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park with Aleksey prior to Election Day, Medvedev also took it upon
himself to visit with Aleksey II ten days before the presidential
elections, on the ostensible occasion of the patriarch’s birthday. With
wife Svetlana in tow, Medvedev wished the patriarch “a happy
birthday, a happy Fatherland Defender Day and a happy name day,
which is upcoming . . . and all the best, energy and good health.” 333
Press accounts also reported that Medvedev offered the patriarch
presents that included a bunch of white roses. 334
Of note, Svetlana Medvedev “now chairs the council of trustees
of the faith-based program Spiritual and Moral Culture of Russia’s
Younger Generation.” 335 This program was launched with the
blessing of Patriarch Aleksey and is intended to promote “the
establishment of Orthodox Church orphanages, educational and
research expeditions for young people and pilgrimages to Russian
patriotic and religious shrines.” 336 The project is also “part of the
Orthodox Church’s drive to reintroduce religion into Russia’s
schools.” 337 Some observers have already speculated that Svetlana
Medvedev “may use her position to increase the influence of the
Orthodox Church in public policy.” 338 It is also worth recalling that
in March 2007 a governmental commission chaired by Medvedev
approved a policy that will enable the ROC to recover Church
property, land, and assets confiscated during the Communist era. 339
With the transfer of power proceeding as planned, it appears that
Russia’s Constitution has four more years of neglect and abuse
ahead. At an Orthodox Easter ceremony overseen by Aleksey II and
attended by Putin and his handpicked successor, Medvedev
333. Medvedev, Wife Visit Head of Russian Orthodox Church, INTERFAX, Feb. 23, 2008,
http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4324.
334. Id. Fatherland Defender Day is a Russian public holiday observed on February 23
that celebrates the country’s armed forces. Aleksey added, “I would also like to wish you a
happy Fatherland Defender Day, it is everyone’s holiday.” Id.
335. Martin Walker, Russia's Modern Czar, UPI, Dec. 12, 2007.
336. Id. Svetlana Medvedev was awarded “a medal from the Orthodox Church for her
social work.” See Kevin O’Flynn & Svetlana Osadchuk, Meet the First Lady in Waiting,
MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007.
337. Nick Holdsworth & Will Stewart, How the Steely Svetlana Turned an Academic into
a President, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 3, 2008, available at http://www
.smh.com.au/news/world/how-steely-svetlana-powered-up-her-mild-man/2008/03/02/
1204402273527.html.
338. The List: Seven Kremlin Powerbrokers to Watch, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 2008,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4229.
339. Yasmann, supra note 324.
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commented that the ROC’s role in society “opens new possibilities
for the cooperation of the [S]tate and the Church in resolving
current questions of culture and the moral health of the nation, in
bringing up the young generation.” 340 Less than two weeks later,
immediately following Medvedev’s inauguration ceremony, the ROC
held a private prayer service for the new president in the
Annunciation Cathedral, formerly the private chapel of the Russian
czars. 341 Patriarch Aleksey II proclaimed: “The Church is ready for
further cooperation with the [S]tate because we have only one
homeland, one history and one future,” and affirmed the “good
tradition to invoke God’s blessing” after the inauguration. 342 In
response, Medvedev promised, “the special, trustful relations with
the [ROC] will be kept and further developed to the benefit of the
Fatherland.” 343 Also in his first afternoon as president, Medvedev
submitted Putin’s nomination to serve as Russia’s next—and newly
empowered—prime minister. 344
In the face of these opening gestures of continuity, there is no
indication that Medvedev will seek to restore the president’s duty
under Article 80 to serve as the guarantor of the Constitution and
“of the rights of man and citizen.” 345 Yet, Medvedev likewise has
demonstrated no inclination that he will have the gumption to seek a
constitutional amendment officially endorsing the reality of the
church-state situation as it stands. 346
340. Orthodox Easter, supra note 316.
341. Andrei Zolotov Jr., Inauguration Augurs: The Inauguration Ceremony Took Place in
a Tsarist Atmosphere, RUSSIA PROFILE, May 8, 2008, available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST,
2008-#91, May 9, 2008.
342. President Dmitry Medvedev said “special relations” with the ROC would be
preserved and developed. ITAR-TASS, May 7, 2008, available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST,
2008-#90, May 8, 2008.
343. Medvedev: Special Relations with Orthodox Church Will Be Maintained, INTERFAX,
May 7, 2008, http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4650.
344. Alexander Osipovich, President Medvedev Stresses the Law, MOSCOW TIMES, May 8,
2008, available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST, 2008-#90, May 8, 2008.
345. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Constitution] art. 80 (Russ.).
346. According to recent poll data, 25% of respondents supported granting the ROC
status as a state religion versus 29% in 2001–2002. Those favoring separation of church and
state also decreased in 2008 to 45% from 53% in 2001 and 50% in 2002. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the survey also found that Russians increasingly had doubts about how to resolve
this issue—jumping from 18% in 2001 to 29% today. Over A Quarter Of Russians Confess to
Not Being Believers – Poll, More and More Russians Have Doubts About How the Issue Should Be
Resolved, INTERFAX, Apr. 24, 2008, available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST, 2008-#81, Apr. 25,
2008.
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As for the ROC, it appears that it will put the brakes on
construction of new churches and reprioritize to focus instead on
“help[ing] our people understand how important it is to adhere to
Christian values.” 347 According to Kirill, “Whether we succeed also
depends on whether we can rid ourselves of outside influences.” 348
And thus, the devaluation of constitutional currency, the breakdown
of separation of church and state, the hampering of religious
freedom, and continued xenophobia in Russia all remain on the
agenda. Yes, there may be challenges along the road, such as the
recent flare up over military draft exemptions, but—as this article has
demonstrated—the ROC is patient and committed to a long-range
vision of Russian society and politics. At present, all signs point to
the fact that the Church will have a willing partner in the Medvedev
government for advancing its objectives. 349 The longer this
relationship of “symbiosis” persists, the more difficult it will be to
break off, and the further Russia will veer off course from its original
constitutional vision of freedom after communism.

347. Spiegel Online International, supra note 52.
348. Id.
349. Indeed, even financial analysts are reaching similar conclusions. Chris Weafer, chief
strategist at Russia’s URALSIB Bank, has concluded Medvedev will “emphasize morality of life
style” and “encourage the role of the [C]hurch.” See Henry Meyer and Sebastian Alison,
Dmitry Medvedev to Confront West With ‘Measured’ Tone, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 29, 2008,
available at JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST, 2008-#44, Feb. 29, 2008.
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